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XENOCRATES' DAEMONS AND THE IRRATIONAL SOUL

In the second century of our era the Athenian Platonist, Atticus, claimed that it was clear not only to philosophers but perhaps even to ordinary people that the heritage left by Plato was the immortality of the soul. Plato had expounded the doctrine in various and manifold ways (*ποικίλως καὶ παντοίως*) and this was about (*σχεδόν*) the only thing holding together the Platonic school.[1] Atticus is but one witness to the prominence accorded the soul in discussions and debates among later Platonists. But while questions concerning the origin, constitution, and destiny of the human soul are relatively well attested for Middle Platonism, not to mention Neoplatonism, we know much less about these topics among Plato's immediate successors in the Academy, Speusippus of Athens (*c.* 408–339) and Xenocrates of Chalcedon (396–314). Both wrote treatises on the soul (*Περὶ ψυχῆς*), but these have been lost along with their other, numerous writings.[2] Because the least that can be said is that Speusippus and Xenocrates upheld the immortality of the soul (as would be expected), any snippet of information that might tell us more deserves close consideration.[3]

In his lectures on the *Phaedo*, Damascius appears to offer additional information in asserting that Xenocrates and Speusippus extended the soul's immortality to its irrational element. His statement is contained in a cursory review of the positions on the immortality of the soul held by the various philosophical schools:

ὅτι οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς ἄχρι τῆς ἐμψύχου ἕξεως ἀπαθανατίζουσιν, ὡς Νουμήνιος· οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς φύσεως, ὡς Πλωτῖνος ἔνι ὅπου· **οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς ἀλογίας, ὡς τῶν μὲν παλαιῶν Ξενοκράτης καὶ Σπεύσιππος,** *τῶν δὲ νεωτέρων Ἰάμβλιχος καὶ Πλούταρχος· οἱ*

[1] Eus. *PE* 15.9.1–2 = fr. 7 Des Places (É. Des Places (ed.), *Atticus: Fragments* (Paris, 1977)). As W. Deuse, *Untersuchungen zur mittel- und neuplatonischen Seelenlehre* (Wiesbaden, 1983), pp. 9f., observes, Atticus' words sound less like a description of an actually existing unity among Platonists than an exhortation to concentrate on this unifying doctrine, especially in the face of contradictory claims arising from Peripatetics. For Platonists themselves the nature and immortality of the soul had become problematical issues: 'Man hat gelernt zu differenzieren, wenn von "der" Seele gesprochen wird, und man betrachtet es nicht mehr als nebensächlich, die Struktur der Seele auch unter dem Aspekt des irrationalen Seelenlebens zu untersuchen' (ibid. p. 10). The extent to which already Xenocrates contributed to the problem of the irrational soul will be part of the present investigation.

[2] See the catalogue of Speusippus' writings in D.L. 4.4–5 = T1 (testimonia and fragment numbers refer to L. Tarán (ed.), *Speusippus of Athens* (Leiden, 1981); henceforth 'Tarán'); on the *Περὶ ψυχῆς* see Tarán's commentary, p. 194. For Xenocrates' writings, see D.L. 4.11–14 (pp. 157–8, Heinze = R. Heinze (ed.), *Xenokrates* (Leipzig, 1892); henceforth 'Heinze' or 'H'; fr. 2 IP = M. Isnardi Parente (ed.), *Senocrate – Ermodoro: Frammenti* (Naples, 1982); henceforth 'Isnardi Parente' or 'IP') and H. Dörrie's overview by subject matter in *RE* IX A, 2 (1967), cols. 1515–16. Xenocrates' *Περὶ ψυχῆς* supposedly contained two books (D.L. 4.13).

[3] For Speusippus the only explicit attestation to the immortality of the soul is fr. 55 Tarán (= fr. 75 H), which we will examine below; we do know, however, that he believed that soul was neither number nor magnitude, that *nous*, as the seat of knowledge in the soul, was divine, and that the cosmos was eternal and without an origin in time – all beliefs compatible with the immortality of the soul; see Tarán, pp. 47–8. On Xenocrates see, besides fr. 75, frr. 73–4 H = 209–10 IP.

δὲ μέχρι μόνης τῆς λογικῆς, ὡς Πρόκλος καὶ Πορφύριος· οἱ δὲ μέχρι μόνου τοῦ νοῦ, φθείρουσι γὰρ τὴν δόξαν, ὡς πολλοὶ τῶν Περιπατητικῶν· οἱ δὲ μέχρι τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς, φθείρουσι γὰρ τὰς μερικὰς εἰς τὴν ὅλην.

Some philosophers extend immortality from the rational soul to the animate state, as Numenius does; others as far as nature, as Plotinus in various passages; others, again, as far as the irrational [soul], as of the ancients Xenocrates and Speusippus, and, of more recent authorities, Iamblichus and Plutarch; others as far as the rational soul alone, as Proclus and Porphyry; others only as far as intelligence, making the opiniative function perishable, as many Peripatetics do; others as far as the universal soul, by which they think individual souls are absorbed.[4]

This doxography, though forgoing any complexities of doctrine, is nonetheless an important testimony to certain continuities, be they ever so polemical, in the history of Platonism. While the reference to Xenocrates and Speusippus has received little scholarly attention, what notice it has received has yielded widely differing interpretations. A *status quaestionis* beginning with Heinze is offered by L. Tarán.[5] Tarán states his own view in response to D. A. Rees, who argued that this passage does not allow us to attribute a bipartition of the soul (into rational and irrational elements) to Xenocrates and Speusippus, since they may have posited more than one irrational element.[6] Tarán contends that Speusippus and Xenocrates need not have spoken of parts of the soul at all, but, following Plato in the *Phaedrus* (245c–247c), may simply have said that all soul is immortal.[7] On the other hand (*pace* Tarán), Damascius' summation does not preclude that Speusippus and Xenocrates posited divisions within the soul. Damascius' indiscriminate pairing of Xenocrates and Speusippus blurs any distinction between them in regard to their doctrines on the human soul. For Xenocrates, however, support for a bipartite soul and indirect evidence to elucidate Damascius' testimony may be found in other sources, particularly those relating to Xenocrates' daemonology. We will therefore leave aside Speusippus and focus solely on Xenocrates.

I

To understand the nature and place of daemons within Xenocrates' system it will be helpful first to outline Xenocrates' universe. This appears to be a three-tiered structure, divided into 1. supercelestial, 2. celestial, and 3. sublunary regions, in which gods, daemons, and men are assigned their appropriate places.[8] 1. The supreme god

[4] *In Phd.* 177.1–7, pp. 107–9 Westerink (= L. G. Westerink, *The Greek Commentaries on Plato's Phaedo*, volume II. *Damascius* (Amsterdam, Oxford, and New York, 1977); Speusippus, fr. 55 Tarán; Xenocrates, fr. 75 H = 211 IP). The above translation is adapted from Westerink's. For comments see H. Dörrie, *Platonica Minora* (Munich, 1976), pp. 426–7 and Westerink, op. cit., pp. 106–9; cf. Tarán, p. 372.

[5] Pp. 371–4.

[6] 'Bipartition of the Soul in the Early Academy', *JHS* 77 (1957), 118.

[7] Although more can be said about this fragment, and Xenocrates in particular, than Tarán allows, I do think he is correct, as opposed to earlier commentators, that ἀλογία indicates Speusippus' and Xenocrates' belief about human souls and not irrational animals. References to animals and plants may be implied, however, in the case of some of the other authors here mentioned; see Dörrie, op. cit. (n. 4), pp. 426ff.; cf. n. 89 below.

[8] This paragraph, except for the reference to frr. 18 and 57 (nn. 9 and 12 below), is based upon fr. 15 H = 213 IP (Aët. 1.7.30; *Dox. gr.* 304). A precise analysis of Xenocrates' gods and their specific locales, examined against the background of Plato's *Timaeus*, is given by M. Baltes, 'Zur Theologie des Xenokrates' in R. van den Broek, T. Baarda, and J. Mansfeld (eds.), *Knowledge of God in the Graeco-Roman World* (Leiden, 1988), pp. 43–68. On the tripartite cosmos, cf. W. Burkert, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism*, trans. E. L. Minar Jr. (Cambridge, Mass. 1972), p. 245 n. 36; J. Mansfeld, *The Pseudo-Hippocratic Tract Περὶ ἑβδομάδων Ch. 1–11 and Greek Philosophy* (Assen, 1971), p. 43 n. 34; cf. also the triad ὄλυμπος–κόσμος–οὐρανός

is the One (the Monad), the male principle in the role of father, ruling in heaven (ἐν οὐρανῷ), and also called Zeus, the uneven, and intellect (νοῦς). Although Zeus is here said to rule ἐν οὐρανῷ, this should not be understood as a precise reference to his fixed habitat, but rather as a carry-over from tradition (e.g. *Il.* 15.192), for we know that Xenocrates posited a 'supreme' (ὕπατος) Zeus who abode 'among the things unchanging and identical'.[9] Zeus is therefore to be thought of as residing beyond heaven, in the invariable and invisible realm of the intelligible, which is tantamount to the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος of the *Phaedrus* (247c).[10] Subordinate to the One is the Dyad, the female principle, mother of gods, the even; the Dyad has dominion over the realm below (ὑπό) the heaven.[11] 2. Heaven itself, which may be regarded as the second tier of the Xenocratean universe, is called a god, and the fiery stars are equated with the Olympian gods. All these inhabit the celestial sphere, with the fixed stars lying upon its surface.[12] 3. Below the region of heaven, i.e. the fixed stars and planets, comes the sublunary world and the invisible daemons who dwell beneath the moon (ὑποσέληνοι δαίμονες). Xenocrates also thought that certain divine powers pervaded

ascribed to Philolaus in DK 44 A 16 (thereto, see J. Kerschensteiner, *Kosmos* (Munich, 1962), pp. 49f.; Burkert, op. cit., pp. 243ff.; Mansfeld, op. cit., pp. 42f.). Another way of understanding the Xenocratean universe, though not at variance with the three-tiered structure presented here, is in terms of an essential bipartition into an intelligible incorporeal order and a sensible cosmic order, the latter being subdivided into celestial and sublunary spheres; cf. Isnardi Parente, pp. 335, 405f., 407f. For a more detailed survey of Xenocrates' cosmology and metaphysical principles than can be given here, see Dörrie, art. cit. (n. 2), cols. 1520–1.

[9] Fr. 18 H = 216–17 IP (Plu. *Plat. quaest.* 1007f; see full annotation in H. Cherniss's Loeb edn., *Plutarch's Moralia*, xiii/1 (Cambridge and London, 1976), n. a, pp. 92f.). Cf. n. 15 below.

[10] Cf. J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (London, 1977), pp. 25f.; id., 'Xenocrates' Metaphysics. Fr. 15 (Heinze) Re-examined', *AncPhil* 5 (1985), 51 n. 2; H. J. Krämer, *Platonismus und Hellenistische Philosophie* (Berlin and New York, 1972), p. 162 n. 42; Mansfeld, op. cit. (n. 8), p. 121 n. 285; Baltes, art. cit. (n. 8), 51. Although earlier in the *Phaedrus*, Zeus, driving his winged chariot, is called the great leader in heaven (μέγας ἡγεμὼν ἐν οὐρανῷ, 246e4), he ultimately leads the heavenly hosts beyond the sights within heaven (ἐντὸς οὐρανοῦ, 247a5) to the 'summit of the arch that supports the heavens' (Hackforth's translation of ἄκραν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπουράνιον ἀψῖδα, 247a8–b1). Here, too, immortal souls actually pass beyond the summit to stand upon the surface of heaven (ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ νώτῳ, 247b7–c1) where they survey the sights outside the heavens (τὰ ἔξω τοῦ οὐρανοῦ, 247c2). The god of the ps.-Aristotelian *De mundo*, 397[b]25ff., 'has the highest and first dwelling and is called supreme (ὕπατος) because according to the poet he dwells "on the loftiest crest" (ἀκροτάτῃ κορυφῇ, *Il.* 1.499) of the whole heaven'; see further Mansfeld, op. cit. (n. 8), pp. 121ff. Aristotle, *M.A.* 699[b]32ff., adduces (not quite fittingly) the Homeric Ζεὺς ὕπατος (*Il.* 8.22) as an illustration of an unmoved mover outside the universe (see M. C. Nussbaum, *Aristotle's De Motu Animalium* (Princeton, 1978), pp. 320f.).

[11] The text goes on to identify the Dyad with the world-soul. This, however, poses a difficulty, primarily because the world-soul is composed of both the Monad and Dyad (see fr. 68 H = 188 IP [Plu. *An. proc.* 1012d–e]). For a concise discussion of the problem and two attempts towards its solution – either a textual corruption or a misunderstanding on the part of Aëtius – see Dillon, art. cit. (n. 10), 47–52. Baltes, art. cit. (n. 8), 50f., offers a third possibility, which commends itself by preserving the special sphere of the world-soul as well as its identity: Monad and Dyad are two aspects of a single divine being whose unity is not to be seen as a mixture but rather as a 'differenzierte Einheit, in der der Nous als das männliche Prinzip gegenüber der Seele als dem weiblichen Prinzip dominiert'.

[12] Ξενοκράτης κατὰ μιᾶς οἴεται ἐπιφανείας κεῖσθαι (κινεῖσθαι ps. Plu.) τοὺς ἀστέρας (fr. 57 H = 162 IP); thereto, see Heinze, p. 72; Dörrie, art. cit. (n. 2), 1524; on the variant κεῖσθαι/κινεῖσθαι, see Isnardi Parente, pp. 379f. If Xenocrates distinguished between the fixed stars and the planets, it is not necessary to see this as marking a major division of his cosmos. It seems rather that the upper hierarchy of heaven, from the fixed stars on its surface and the subordinate planets to the region of the moon, formed one partition; similarly, Baltes, art. cit. (n. 8), 56.

the material elements.[13] The divine power that pervaded the *aer* (ἀήρ) between moon and earth he called Hades, possibly making an etymological play on 'invisible' (Ἅιδης – ἀειδής).[14] For this sublunary realm Xenocrates also established a lowest hypostasis of Zeus (νέατος ... ὑπὸ σελήνην), undoubtedly as lord of Hades, in polar contrast to Zeus ὕπατος.[15] The powers pervading water and earth, which Xenocrates called Poseidon and generative Demeter, complete the third tier of the universe.[16]

This triadic structure of the cosmos finds a matching epistemology, which will also have some bearing on our understanding of the nature of Xenocrates' daemons. According to Sextus Empiricus, Xenocrates spoke of three existences (οὐσίαι): the sensible (αἰσθητή) within heaven, the intelligible (νοητή) outside of heaven, and a compound of the two, the opiniable (δοξαστή), heaven itself.[17] We may then discern the following correlation with the tripartite schema outlined above: the intelligible existence outside heaven corresponds to the supercelestial domain of Zeus;[18] the opinable level of existence, heaven itself, corresponds to the celestial spheres of the stars and planets;[19] and thirdly, the realm of sense perception corresponds to the

[13] ἀρέσκει δὲ αὐτῷ ⟨θείας τινὰς δυνάμεις⟩ καὶ ἐνδιήκειν τοῖς ὑλικοῖς στοιχείοις. Lac. suppl. Heinze: θεῶν δυνάμεις Krische: θείας εἶναι δυνάμεις Zeller. According to Baltes, art. cit. (n. 8), 61, the divine powers are emanations of the Olympian gods; on their number (twelve) and identity, see ibid. 61–3.

[14] τούτων (i.e. θείων δυνάμεων) δὲ τὴν μὲν ⟨διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος Ἅιδην ὡς⟩ ἀειδῆ προσαγορεύει. Heinze's restoration of the lacuna, inasmuch as it preserves ἀειδῆ *iuxta lacunam*, is preferable to Wachsmuth's ⟨διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος προσγείου⟩ Ἅιδην. But ἀειδής should be taken as itacism for ἀϊδής (ἀ – ϝιδεῖν; cf. variants at Plato, *Grg.* 493b4 and E. R. Dodds (ed.), *Plato: Gorgias* (Oxford, 1959), ad loc.) and translated 'invisible' (so also Isnardi Parente, p. 415), rather than 'formless' (so e.g. Dillon, op. cit. (n. 10), 25). The invisible Hades is the proper domain of the ἀόρατοι δαίμονες. For a play on the invisible soul and Hades, cf. Plato, *Phd.* 79a9f., b7 and esp. 80d5–7 (thereto see D. Gallop (trans.), *Plato: Phaedo* (Oxford, 1975), p. 143). On further variations of the theme Ἅιδης – ἀειδής, see Heinze, p. 147 and n. 2; also Plot. VI. 4.16.37; Porph. *Sent.* 29, p. 18, 12f. Lamberz (thereto see Dörrie, op. cit (n. 4), p. 449).

[15] Fr. 18 (n. 9 above). Given the triadic tendency of Xenocrates' philosophy, A. B. Krische supposed that Xenocrates also posited a Ζεὺς μέσος who animated the region above the moon (*Die theologischen Lehren der griechischen Denker* (Göttingen, 1840), p. 324); this supposition has continued to Krämer, op. cit. (n. 10), p. 124, and Baltes, art. cit. (n. 8), 59 and n. 61, who adduces Plut. *Quaest. conviv.* 745b. On the other hand, Cherniss, op. cit. (n. 9), n. a, p. 93, argues that Plutarch would not have failed to mention a median Zeus in his discussion of the correspondence of Plato's tripartite soul to the lowest, middle, and highest notes of the musical scale, and that it may well have sufficed Xenocrates to have treated Zeus 'only in his two commonly recognized aspects as ὕψιστος and χθόνιος ...' (cf. Dillon, op. cit. (n. 4), 27; H. Schwabl, *RE* Suppl. XV col. 1345; P. Boyancé, 'Xénocrate et les Orphiques', *RÉA* 50 (1948), 226f.). This seems to me a still valid observation and may serve us as an instructive example when we come to examine Xenocrates' divisions of the soul: it is not necessary to see tripartition everywhere in Xenocrates.

[16] From Plutarch, *Fac. lun.* 943f–944a (fr. 56H = 161 IP), we get corroborating evidence that the physical domains of Xenocrates' universe were composed of specific elements (as we have already seen in the case of the moon) and also of different degrees of physical density (τὸ πυκνόν).

[17] Fr. 5 H = 83 IP (*M.* 7.147 (ii.36 Mutschmann)). Sextus' testimony concludes by listing the three Fates and the level of existence to which Xenocrates assigned each of them. On Xenocrates' use of the Μοῖραι as cosmological divisions, see R. Harder (ed.), '*Ocellus Lucanus*' (Berlin, 1926), p. 91.

[18] See n. 10 above.

[19] The opiniable existence of heaven is a composite (σύνθετον) of the sensible and the intelligible, since it is visible by sense perception but intelligible by astronomy (I am assuming that ὁρατὴ μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῇ αἰσθήσει, νοητὴ δὲ δι' ἀστρολογίας in fr. 5 is not an explanatory clause by Sextus). The truth concerning the median heaven (though its celestial denizens – the sun, stars, and other planets – are no less objects of sense perception than the αἰσθητά of the sublunary world) is then ultimately a matter of intellection; it depends upon the calculations of mathematics, particularly astronomy. Cf. Theophrastus, *Met.* 6^{b}7–9; fr. 26 H = 100 IP; thereto,

sublunary world, including of course the earth, which according to the ancient world view may be said to lie 'within' the heavens.[20]

Xenocrates' daemons roughly occupy a median place in this hierarchy: as sublunary beings they can move among the world of men, but their existence also borders that of the heavenly gods.[21] In accord with their intermediary status between men and gods their nature (*φύσις*) partakes of both human affection (*πάθος*) and divine power (*δύναμις*).[22] Their susceptibility to *πάθη* renders certain daemons evil.[23] As Plutarch

see H. J. Krämer, *Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik* (Amsterdam, 1964), pp. 34f., who adduces the often compared reference to Xenocrates in Arist. *Met.* 1028^{b}24ff. (fr. 34 H = 103 IP) for the identification of ideas and mathematicals; on this admittedly problematical issue in Xenocrates, see further, Heinze, pp. 49f.; W. D. Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics* (Oxford, 1924), lxxv, n. 2 and nn. *ad* 1028^{b}24, ^{b}26–7; id. and F. H. Fobes, *Theophrastus Metaphysics* (Oxford, 1929), pp. 56f.; H. Happ, *Hyle* (Berlin and New York, 1971), pp. 243, 245; H. Cherniss, *The Riddle of the Early Academy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1945), pp. 43f., 47f., 52, 58; id., *Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy* (Baltimore, 1944), pp. 208, 196ff., 399, 484; but cf. also the argument for mathematicals as intermediates by P. Merlan, *From Platonism to Neoplatonism*^{3} (The Hague, 1975), p. 42 n. ** (sic), pp. 44ff., *contra*, e.g. Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism*, p. 511; see further, Isnardi Parente, pp. 334f. The description of heaven as visible by sight but intelligible by astronomy implies in effect a distinction between observational and pure, i.e. mathematical astronomy, and brings to mind Plato's assertion that the true revolutions and inter-relations of celestial phenomena are 'apprehended by reason and discursive thought, and not by sight' (*Rep.* 529d; see D. R. Dicks, *Early Greek Astronomy to Aristotle* (London, 1970), pp. 104ff., esp. p. 106).

[20] In the geocentric universe of the Greeks the earth occupies the centre of heaven (cf. e.g. Plato, *Phd.* 108e5), which is tantamount to the centre of the cosmos, given the common identification of *οὐρανός* = *κόσμος*; cf. e.g. Plato, *Plt.* 269d7–8, *Ti.* 28b1–2, [Pl.] *Epin.* 977b2; see further, Dicks, op. cit. (n. 19), pp. 117f., 142; Mansfeld, op. cit. (n. 8), p. 47. Cf. also [Pl.] *Def.* 411c5–6.

[21] Plato's pronouncement, *Symp.* 202e, on the intermediate state of the daemonic realm became virtually a theological dogma in subsequent doctrines of daemons. For Plato the median position of daemons is largely governed by their hermeneutic role (*Symp.* 202d–203a; cf. [Pl.] *Epin.* 984e–985b). On *δαίμων* and *δαιμόνιον* in Plato, see P. Friedländer, *Platon* i^{2} (Berlin, 1954), pp. 34–62, esp. 34–46. On Xenocrates' daemonology, see Heinze, pp. 78–123; cf. W. Burkert, *Greek Religion*, trans. J. Raffan (Cambridge, Mass., 1985), pp. 329f., 332; Dörrie, art. cit. (n. 2); 1524f.; Dillon, op. cit. (n. 10), pp. 31f., Isnardi Parente, pp. 414–18. The main source for a reconstruction of Xenocrates' daemonology is Plutarch, from whose own doctrines Xenocrates' views must be carefully extricated; see nn. 54 and 56 below. On Plutarch, see G. Soury, *La Démonologie de Plutarque* (Paris, 1942); F. E. Brenk, '"A Most Strange Doctrine": Daimon in Plutarch', *CJ* 69 (1973), 1–11; id., *In Mist Apparalled* (Leiden, 1977), *passim* but esp. chs. 4 and 6; id., 'In the Light of the Moon: Daemonology in the Early Imperial Period', *ANRW* 16.3 (1986), 2117–30; id., 'An Imperial Heritage: The Religious Spirit of Plutarch of Chaironea', *ANRW* 36.1 (1987), 275–94; Dillon, op. cit. (n. 10), pp. 216–24.

[22] Plu. *Def. or.* 416c–d (fr. 23 H = 222 IP); cf. Soury, op. cit. (n. 21), pp. 26, 35. The two-fold nature of Plutarch's daemons is bound up with the bipartition of the soul into rational and irrational parts – a conception, as we shall argue, that derives from Xenocrates. Cf. M. D. Babut in *Actes du VIII*^{e} *Congrès G. Budé* (Paris, 1969), p. 531.

[23] Plu. *Def. or.* 419a (fr. 24 H = 226 IP). According to Plutarch again (*Is. et Os.* 361b; fr. 25 H = 229 IP), Xenocrates characterized evil daemons as great and mighty natures in the atmosphere, but surly and sullen, who delighted in days of ill omen and those festivals that entailed beatings, lamentations, fastings, blasphemies, or obscenity (cf. *Def. or.* 417c and the discussion of both Plutarch passages by Soury, op. cit. (n. 21), pp. 51ff.). Whatever the motivations at certain Greek festivals for the activities enumerated by Plutarch (on fasting, obscenity, and flagellation at e.g. the *Thesmophoria*, see Burkert, op. cit. (n. 21), pp. 243–4; cf. pp. 104f.; H. W. Parke, *Fetivals of the Athenians* (London, 1977), p. 86; Soury, op. cit. (n. 21), pp. 52f.), Xenocrates apparently viewed them as having an underlying apotropaic function: meeting with such activities, evil daemons 'turn to nothing worse' (in *Def. or.* 417c, eating raw flesh, tearing apart victims, fastings, and beating of the breast are likewise said to be practised *δαιμόνων φαύλων ἀποτροπῆς ἕνεκα*; cf. n. 54 below). Daemons also rejoiced in *ἡμέραι*

clarifies in a passage for which Xenocrates appears to be the main source, daemons, though superior to men, nonetheless do not possess the divine element unalloyed but 'it shares its lot with the nature of the soul and the sense perception (*αἴσθησις*) of the body'; hence daemons are receptive of pleasure and pain and as many affections as attend these changes. The affections may in turn trouble (*ἐπιταράττει*) even daemons, some more and some less, which also serves to explain the different degrees of virtue and vice among daemons, as among men.[24] What emerges clearly from Plutarch's discussion is the composite nature of daemons and its explanation in terms of human psychology.

ἀποφράδες, most likely because of the impurity associated with these days: the annual *Plynteria* at which the garments of Athena were purified, and those days on which homicide cases were judged (see J. D. Mikalson, '*Ἡμέρα ἀποφράς*', *AJPh* 96 (1975), 19–27; Soury, op. cit. (n. 21), p. 52, should only be read in light of Mikalson's delimitation of ill-omened days). One should note further that Xenocrates distinguishes the practices favoured by evil daemons from the honours accorded the gods and 'good daemons' (*δαιμόνων ... χρηστῶν*, *Is. et Os.* 361b); here one may think of the libations to 'good fortune' (*ἀγαθῷ δαίμονι*), a custom that seems to have been invested with cultic dimensions (Burkert, op. cit. (n. 21), p. 180 and n. 9; E. Rohde, *Psyche* i[3] [Tübingen and Leipzig, 1903], p. 254 n. 2), but other than this there is no evidence of cults relating specifically to daemons in the fourth century; cf. J. D. Mikalson, *Athenian Popular Religion* (Chapel Hill and London, 1983), p. 66. (A slightly different matter were the cults dedicated to the 'averting gods' – *ἀποτρόπαιοι θεοί*; see H. Herter, *Rhein. Jb. f. Volkskunde* 1 (1950), 136 = *Kl. Schr.* (Munich, 1975), 68). But leaving aside the question of cult practices associated with daemons, the distinction between good and bad daemons existed only as an inchoate notion before the fourth century, and Xenocrates is not unjustly credited with having brought into relief the evil daemonic powers. Although Plutarch (*Def. or.* 419a) also cites Plato as a source for *φαῦλοι δαίμονες*, in the Platonic corpus daemons are consistently portrayed under a beneficent aspect; see e.g. *Phd.* 107d–e, *Crat.* 398b–c. The daemons of the *Epinomis* (984b ff.) possess a sympathetic knowledge of pain and pleasure, but have not yet attained the full participation in human affections as we see it in Xenocrates and Plutarch (see again *Def. or.* 416c–d (fr. 23 H = 222 IP) and n. 24 below; cf. F. Solmsen, 'Antecedents of Aristotle's Psychology and Scale of Beings', *AJPh* 76 (1955), 163; for a list of affinities between the author of the *Epinomis* and Xenocrates, in areas besides daemonology as well, see Krämer, op. cit. (n. 10), p. 126 n. 88, but cf. also L. Tarán, *Academica: Plato, Philip of Opus, and the Pseudo-Platonic Epinomis* (Philadelphia, 1975), p. 152). *Rep.* 619c implies that *τυχή* and daemons are unjustly blamed for misfortunes. Xenocrates' rudimentary typology of daemons was of consequence for later refinements and schematizations in the doctrines of daemons, in which special emphasis and interest were given the sinister type. Cf. Burkert, op. cit. (n. 21), pp. 179, 332, Herter, op. cit., p. 141 (= *Kl. Schr.* 73).

[24] *... οὓς* (i.e. *δαίμονας*) *καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Πυθαγόρας καὶ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Χρύσιππος ἑπόμενοι τοῖς πάλαι θεολόγοις ἐρρωμενεστέρους μὲν ἀνθρώπων γεγονέναι λέγουσι καὶ πολὺ τῇ δυνάμει τὴν φύσιν ὑπερφέροντας ἡμῶν, τὸ δὲ θεῖον οὐκ ἀμιγὲς οὐδ' ἄκρατον ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχῆς φύσει καὶ σώματος αἰσθήσει* [*ἐν*] (*ἐν Ω*: deest ap. Eus.: *ἓν* Griffiths) *συνειληχὸς ἡδονὴν δεχομένους* (*-μένους* Strijd: *-μένην Ω*: *-μένῃ* Griffiths, Sieveking corr. ex Eus.: *-μενον* Cherniss) *καὶ πόνον καὶ ὅσα ταύταις ἐπιγενόμενα* (*γενόμενα* Eus. corr. Pohlenz: *ἐγγενόμενα Ω* Griffiths) *ταῖς μεταβολαῖς πάθη τοὺς μὲν μᾶλλον τοῦς δ' ἧττον ἐπιταράττει· γίνονται γὰρ ὡς ἐν ἀνθρώποις καὶ δαίμοσιν ἀρετῆς διαφοραὶ καὶ κακίας. Is. et Os.* 360d–e (fr. 24 H = 225 IP); see commentaries by T. Hopfner, *Plutarch über Isis und Osiris*, ii (Prague, 1941), pp. 112ff., J. G. Griffiths, *Plutarch's* De Iside et Osiride (University of Wales Press, 1970), pp. 383ff.). Cf. the similar description of daemons in *Def. or.* 416c: *... φύσεις εἰσί τινες ὥσπερ ἐν μεθορίῳ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων δεχόμεναι πάθη θνητὰ καὶ μεταβολὰς ἀναγκαίας ....* For the meaning of the term *μεταβολή*, see n. 61 below. On Xenocrates as the dominant source for chs. 25 and 26 of *Is. et Os.* (360d ff.), see Heinze, p. 82 (M. Detienne, *RÉA* 60 (1958), pp. 272ff., in contrast, argues that this and other passages assigned by Heinze to Xenocrates are largely derived from ancient Pythagorean daemonology; but cf. n. 55 below). Although the influence of Chrysippus should not be discounted, it remains uncertain whether he included among daemons the souls of the dead, whereas this was almost certainly the belief of Xenocrates (see *Def. or.* 417b, and n. 55 below); on Chrysippus see *SVF* ii. 1101–5; M. Pohlenz, *Die Stoa*, i (Göttingen, 1947), p. 96; ii (1949), p. 54.

There is, then, a close analogy between daemons and human souls. Indeed, daemons, being invisible and presumably incorporeal, are 'soulish' creatures, yet by their participation in the nature of the human soul they are subject to the kinds of experiences that affect the soul via corporeal sense perception.[25] The more daemons allow themselves to partake of human *πάθη*, the more disturbed and vicious they are. Evil daemons delight in sadistic and lugubrious practices among mankind[26] because of the parasitic enjoyment they derive from such activities, in which they themselves, lacking bodies, cannot engage directly. Since the psychic bond between daemons and humans is effected by *αἴσθησις*, we should naturally assume that the human soul is in part composed of a sensitive element. This is borne out by Theodoret of Cyrrhus:

Πυθαγόρας μὲν γὰρ καὶ Πλάτων διμερῆ ταύτην (sc. *τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν φύσιν*) *εἰρήκασι, καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς εἶναι λογικόν, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον. διχῇ δ' αὖ πάλιν τὸ ἄλογον ἔτεμον, καὶ τὸ μὲν αὐτοῦ θυμικὸν εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἐπιθυμητικόν.* **ὁ δὲ Ξενοκράτης... τὸ μὲν αἰσθητικὸν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς ἔφη, τὸ δὲ λογικόν.**

Pythagoras and Plato too have said that it (the nature of the soul) is bipartite, one part of it rational, the other irrational. The irrational part is again divisible in two ways, the one part of it spirited, the other appetitive. Xenocrates... said that one part of the soul is sensitive, the other rational.[27]

We will return to the reference to Plato later, but with respect to Xenocrates we are immediately faced with the question of how Theodoret's mention of a sensitive part of the soul might coincide with Damascius' reference to the irrational soul.

II

A backward glance at the *Timaeus* proves instructive. In the cosmological context of this later dialogue, Plato's psychology is in the main given a bipartite cast. Souls are of two kinds, the divine/intellective and the mortal/corporeal, which relate to the world of Being and Ideas and the world of Becoming and sensibles respectively.[28] Plato in the *Timaeus* never explicitly calls the mortal soul (or the mortal part of the soul) irrational (*ἄλογος*), but by its conjunction with corporeal nature it is subject to the random impact of sensations, to affections and emotions of various sorts, and to the processes of growth and nutrition; in short, the mortal element becomes the domain of all that is irrational.[29] Sensation in particular, being inherent (*ξύμφυτον*) in the body (42a6), is repeatedly termed an irrational capacity.[30] Thus, while the ideal world of Being is apprehended by thought along with reason (*νοήσει μετὰ λόγου*), the material world of Becoming is grasped by opinion with irrational sense perception (*μετ' αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου*, 28a2, cf. 69d4).[31] The *Timaeus* offers the most detailed

[25] On the problems posed by the immaterial nature of daemons, cf. Isnardi Parente, pp. 417f. and see n. 100 below.

[26] See n. 23 above.

[27] *Gr. aff. cur.* 5. 19 p. 127 Raeder (Diels, *Dox. gr.* 389f.; fr. 70 H = 206 IP).

[28] 35a, 41c–d, 42e–44d, 65a5, 69c–d, 72d. Cf. A. Graeser, *Probleme der platonischen Seelenteilungslehre* (Munich, 1969), p. 70; T. M. Robinson, *Plato's Psychology* (Toronto, 1970), pp. 71ff.

[29] Cf. 42a3–d2, 43a6–44b1, 69c6–d6, 70d7–71a7, 71d4, 77b (hence Philo of Alexandria, *Leg. all.* 2.6, could simply state *τὸ δὲ ἄλογον αἰσθησίς ἐστι καὶ τὰ ταύτης ἔκγονα πάθη*).

[30] On the non-cognitive, non-propositional nature of *αἴσθησις* in the *Timaeus*, see A. Silverman, 'Plato on Perception and "Commons"', *CQ* 40 (1990), 149–58.

[31] Opinions and beliefs arise to the rational soul whenever it is concerned with the sensible (37b6–8, cf. Graeser, op. cit. (n. 28), p. 69), but the rational soul never engages directly in sense perception; although it may form opinions and beliefs about what is sensed, the sensations themselves are simply material movements that terminate in the mortal, irrational soul (69c5–d6 in conjunction with 42e5–44c4).

treatment of sense perception in the Platonic corpus.[32] It follows naturally for Plato, in an account describing the genesis of both cosmos and soul, to examine closely how the sensibles of the material creation – the body and its physical environs – impinge upon the incarnate psyche and consequently affect its mortal and immortal parts. Plato is emphatic that it is impossible to explain the affections (*παθήματα*) of the embodied soul without introducing sensation (61c4–d1).

The *Timaeus* would have furnished Xenocrates a likely precedent not only for the rudimentary division of the soul into two parts but also for the depiction of the inferior part as *τὸ αἰσθητικόν*. While we do not know how closely Xenocrates adhered to the Platonic model of the sensitive soul,[33] we can readily allow that as a general characterization *τὸ αἰσθητικόν* is compatible with Plato's conception of the mortal soul, as we saw from even our brief glance at the *Timaeus*.

At this point it may be objected that the *Timaeus* also speaks of three parts of the soul as in the *Republic* (Book 4). True, but the constituents of Plato's tripartite psychology in the *Republic* are given physiological designations in the *Timaeus* and as such do not clash with the fundamental division of the soul into immortal and mortal.[34] The divine and immortal part, reason (*λόγος*), is located in the head and clearly separated from the mortal kind of soul in the chest or thorax, which comprises a 'better' and a 'worse' part, the spirited (*θυμός*) and appetitive (*ἐπιθυμητικόν*). Of these latter two, spirit is located higher up in the chest in order that by its proximity to the head it may hearken to reason (*τοῦ λόγου κατήκοον*) and subdue the appetites situated in the region of the belly (69d6–70d7). Since the appetitive element lacks opinion, reasoning, and mind, but partakes of sensations and desires (77b; cf. 71a), it is plainly irrational. The spirited element, notwithstanding its ability to listen to reason, also belongs unambiguously to the mortal kind of soul (in 69d, *θυμός* is listed with the classical affections: pleasure, pain, rashness, fear, hope, all of which are blended with irrational sensation and daring desire); the *θυμός* cannot therefore be pointed to as upsetting the general immortal/rational and mortal/irrational dualism that informs this dialogue.[35]

This reading of the *Timaeus*, which harmonizes the anatomical distribution of the soul with its basic bipartite nature, suggests itself naturally, without depending on Peripatetic interpretations and later doxographical summaries of Platonic psychology. However, since Plato's doctrine of the soul is usually summed up in the doxographies as a bipartition into rational and irrational, we need to survey these briefly, if we are to see Theodoret's reference to Xenocrates in its proper context.

The doxographical tradition on soul-division has a convoluted history going back to the Peripatos, where references to both tripartition and bipartition may be found. In *De anima* 432ª24–6 the Platonically based triad of *λογιστικόν–θυμικόν–ἐπιθυμητικόν* is set off (*τινες – οἱ δέ*) from the doctrine of those who posited only rational and irrational parts (*τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον*). Seminal for later doxographical compendia is *Magna Moralia* 1182ª24–6, *Πλάτων διείλετο τὴν ψυχὴν*

[32] See esp. 45b2–47e2, 61c3–68d7. The only comparable account of sense perception is found in the *Theaetetus*; thereto, Silverman, art. cit. (n. 30), 158–75, esp. 158–63.

[33] The question of the lower soul's mortality, which we will take up below, was quite possibly a point of divergence.

[34] On the three parts see 44d5, 69d6–70d7, 73d, 87a2–3, 89e4–5, 90a4–5; cf. Graeser, op. cit. (n. 28), p. 70; Robinson, op. cit. (n. 28), pp. 105ff., 119ff; Rees, art. cit. (n. 6), 113; F. Dirlmeier, *Aristoteles Nikomachische Ethik* (Berlin, 1960), p. 279; on the 'psycho-physical system' in the *Timaeus*, see Solmsen, art. cit. (n. 23), 153–7.

[35] Isnardi Parente, p. 398, points to the possible Pythagorean origins for the Platonic contrast of reason versus passion.

εἴς τε τὸ λόγον ἔχον καὶ εἰς τὸ ἄλογον ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἀπέδωκεν ἑκάστῳ [τὰς] ἀρετὰς προσηκούσας. The explicit attribution here to Plato, though an apparent contradiction to *De an.* 432ª24–6, is defended by F. Dirlmeier, who reasons that the tripartition of the *Republic*, the *Phaedrus*, and especially the *Timaeus* allows the combination of the θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν components into one psychological division over against the rational, not unlike the procedure in *Top.* 129ª10–16.[36] At the same time it may need to be emphasized that the bipartite soul became a working model in its own right for the moral psychology of Aristotle and the Peripatos.[37]

The Peripatetic terrain in regard to the division of the soul has been carefully re-examined by P. A. Vander Waerdt.[38] His thesis is that Peripatetic interpretation of Platonic psychology in terms of bipartition, as evidenced by the author of the *Magna Moralia* but presumably already based upon a commonplace in the Peripatos, is founded on Aristotelian bipartition and Aristotle's doctrine of desire (ὄρεξις). The Peripatetic division of the soul into τὸ λόγον ἔχον and τὸ ἄλογον, which removes the 'special status' of Plato's θυμοειδές by subsuming it under the irrational, therefore fundamentally misrepresents Plato's tripartition, though this flawed interpretation became canonical for later doxography and also misled those modern scholars (as Rees, Dirlmeier, Hardie, and others) who take *M.M.* 1182ª24f. as evidence for bipartition in Plato. Vander Waerdt's argument that the Peripatetic passages dealing with bipartition are governed by philosophical considerations of their own would be hard to dispute and urges caution in using these texts as historical evidence for a development in Platonic doctrine on the soul; he rightly stresses, moreover, that the *Magna Moralia*'s critique of Platonic psychology does not pertain to the *Timaeus* but directs itself mainly against the *Republic* and that dialogue's distribution of the souls' excellences (ἀρεταί). Notwithstanding Vander Waerdt's positive contributions to the study of the Peripatos, his apparent understanding of Platonic psychology as a fixed doctrine of tripartition does not do justice, in my estimation, to the dynamic and versatile thought of Plato. For it may be said, at the risk of oversimplification, that Plato's treatment of the soul is always directed *ad rem*, depending, that is, upon the orientation of a particular dialogue. Thus tripartition figures significantly in the *Republic*, given its threefold division of the state, whereas in the *Timaeus*, with its overall cosmic distinction between Being and Becoming, intelligence and matter, it stands to reason that dichotomies of immortal/mortal, incorporeal/corporeal, reasonable/affective should characterize the constitution of the soul. In the *Laws* bipartition again appears paramount, though here it is based primarily upon a λογισμός–πάθη distinction.[39] Plato's treatment of the soul is in short never simple and static; it varies according to the context in which Plato introduces it and the perspective from which he views it (the same, as is well known, applies to Aristotle's psychology). Understandably, less original thinkers, as Xenocrates, would be prone to systematize Plato's teaching, and compilers of δόξαι to summarize. For the doxographers in particular the *Magna Moralia*'s distillation of Platonic psychology into a rational–irrational partition, whatever the philosophical motivations within

[36] *Aristoteles, Magna Moralia* (Berlin, 1958), pp. 163–5; op. cit. (n. 34), pp. 278–9, 292–3.

[37] Cf. e.g. Iamb. *Protr.* 34, 12–15 Pistelli = fr. 23 Düring; 41, 20–4 Pistelli = fr. 6, p. 35 Ross = fr. 6, pp. 33f. Walzer = fr. 60 Düring; see further D. A. Rees, 'Theories of the Soul in the Early Aristotle', in I. Düring and G. E. L. Owen (eds.), *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-fourth Century* (Gothenburg, 1960), pp. 195–9 (where at p. 195 n. 7, '*Eud.* fr. 6' should read '*Protr.* fr. 6') and W. F. R. Hardie, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory*² (Oxford, 1980), pp. 218ff.

[38] 'The Peripatetic Interpretation of Plato's Tripartite Psychology', *GRBS* 26 (1985), 283–302. On *De an.* 432ª24–b7, see id., 'Aristotle's Criticism of Soul-Division', *AJPh* 108 (1987), 627–43.

[39] See Graeser, op. cit. (n. 28), pp. 102ff.; cf. Rees, art. cit. (n. 6), 115f.

this Peripatetic treatise, provided a convenient paradigm.[40] Any analysis of Plato's view of the soul must be squarely based on the corpus itself. The discussions of the Peripatos, no doubt often conducted in debate with the Academy, provide at best 'circumstantial evidence' which should only be admitted with the utmost judiciousness.[41]

Returning to Theodoret's compendium of the philosophers' opinions *περὶ ψυχῆς*, we recognize that the *λογικόν–ἄλογον* profile for Plato, which directly precedes our reference to Xenocrates, follows the doxographical tradition.[42] As for Xenocrates, however plausible it may be that he spoke of an irrational element or part of the soul (most likely in his *Περὶ ψυχῆς*), this should not be inferred, as is often done, from Peripatetic writings, for example, from Arist. *E.N.* 1102ª26–8: *λέγεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς* (i.e. *ψυχῆς*) *καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἔνια, καὶ χρηστέον αὐτοῖς· οἷον τὸ μὲν ἄλογον αὐτῆς εἶναι, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον*. Those who have seen here a connection with Xenocrates depend upon the 'extraneous discourses' – *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι* – as referring to Academic writings.[43] But although the rational–irrational distinction of the soul may initially have been Platonic/Academic property and, in my view, conformable to Xenocrates' structure of the soul, it soon passed into the usufruct of Aristotle and the Peripatos (especially when considered in the larger context of Aristotle's classification of virtues, 1103ª3–10), and its provenance in the 'extraneous discourses' points to other Aristotelian writings such as the *Protrepticus*.[44] Thus, while Xenocrates' *αἰσθητικόν–λογικόν* distinction of the soul implies a bipartite division, this division need not be seen as having been foisted on Xenocrates by the dominant twofold model in the doxographers. The fact that Xenocrates is separated from Plato in Theodoret – whether or not one believes that the Platonic summary itself is justified – strongly hints that Xenocrates treated the lower soul under the special rubric of sensation. At the same time, nothing here or

[40] On the consequent influence of Peripatetic bipartition on the doxographical tradition, see P. A. Vander Waerdt, 'Peripatetic Soul-Division, Posidonius, and Middle Platonic Moral Psychology', *GRBS* 26 (1985), 373–94.

[41] In this, I think, lies the lesson of Vander Waerdt's article for students of Plato. For a general understanding of the soul in Plato as a 'differentiated unity', see R. W. Hall, *Plato and the Individual* (The Hague, 1963), pp. 141–62.

[42] *Gr. aff. cur.* 5.19, p. 127 Raeder (Diels, *Dox. gr.* 389): see p. 149 above. Theodoret's source for the Platonic bipartition and the further subdivision into spirited and appetitive parts is Aët. 4.4.1 (Diels, *Dox. gr.* 389f. = ps. Plut. *Plac.* 898e = Eus., *PE* 15.60.1–4; cf. Plut. *Virt. mor.* 442a); cf. Rees, art. cit. (n. 6), 114; Dirlmeier, op. cit. (n. 36), p. 165; Vander Waerdt, 'Peripatetic Soul-Division' (n. 40), 375, 379f. (For his recapitulation of the strife – *ἔρις* – about the soul among pagan philosophers, Theodoretus explicitly lists Plutarch and Aëtius, along with Porphyry, as his sources: *Gr. aff. cur.* 5.16, cf. 2.95, 4.31; unnamed for this section are Clement and Eusebius. On Theodoretus' use of source texts see P. Canivet, (ed.), *Théodoret de Cyr, Thérapeutique des maladies helléniques* (Paris, 1958), pp. 55–9; É. Des Places, 'Le Platon de Théodoret: les citations de Lois et de l'Épinomis', *REG* 68 [1955], 171–84 = *Études platoniciennes* (Leiden, 1981), pp. 229–42). On the appearance of Pythagoras with Plato, see Vander Waerdt, 'Peripatetic Soul-Division' (n. 40), 376f., 387ff., 391ff.

[43] So Heinze, Burnet, and others; see Dirlmeier, op. cit. (n. 36), p. 165; op. cit. (n. 34), pp. 274–5.

[44] See n. 37 above. This is not to deny that Aristotle later, in the 'new psychology' of the *De Anima*, discounted the usefulness of speaking of the soul's rational and irrational parts; see J. M. Rist, *The Mind of Aristotle* (Toronto, 1989), pp. 183–4. Even here in Bk. 1 of the *Nic. Ethics* (1102ª28–32), Aristotle goes on to say that the question of the divisibility of the soul, whether understood as real or logical, makes no difference to his argument. On the *ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι* see W. Jaeger, *Aristotle*, tr. R. Robinson (Oxford, 1948², pp. 246–58; Vander Waerdt, 'The Peripatetic Interpretation' (n. 38), 283 n. 2; on *E.N.* 1102ª26–8 in particular, see Hardie, op. cit. (n. 37), pp. 68ff.; cf. Rees, art. cit. (n. 6), 118; Graeser, op. cit. (n. 28), p. 70 n. 6.

elsewhere in the testimonia forbids us to associate the sensible with the irrational along the Platonic lines drawn in the *Timaeus*. Xenocrates' τὸ αἰσθητικόν points to that part of the soul which links the psyche to the material, sensate world (the αἰσθητὴ οὐσία); as such it merely serves as the conduit for sensations and operates without reason. The dichotomy of τὸ αἰσθητικόν–τὸ λογικόν not only implies that the sensitive element lacks what its counterpart possesses, but it conceivably also points to the antithetical dimension of the two divisions, in so far as the sensible part may give rise to affections and passions that militate against reason, and that reason in turn must conquer. Xenocrates is on record for the dictum that philosophy was discovered to stop turmoil (ταραχῶδες) in the affairs of life (fr. 4 H = 253 IP). For daemons, as we learned above, turmoil arose from the affections introduced by corporeal sensation; the same obviously applies for humans, though humans might find rest from the disturbances of life in philosophy.[45] The philosophical life would be governed by the rational element of the soul and opposed by the disturbing forces of irrationality stemming from its sensitive element.[46] While the rational part is contrasted specifically with 'the sensitive' in Theodoret's account, all that τὸ αἰσθητικόν implies – the sensations that occur to the body by means of irrational αἴσθησις and the affections and consequent upheaval they may cause in the human soul as well as in daemonic natures – renders it virtually equivalent to the irrational as the fundamental opposite of the rational. There is then no discrepancy between the αἰσθητικόν found in Theodoret and the ἀλογία ascribed to Xenocrates by Damascius.

III

We have seen that the composite nature of Xenocrates' daemons reflects their intermediate status between gods and men: their divine part (τὸ θεῖον) relates them to the gods, and their capacity to share in the sensory affections of the human soul

[45] Porph. *In harm.* pp. 30ff. Düring (fr. 9 H = 87 IP) offers a minor instance illustrating the turmoil as well as the deceptiveness of sensations, especially in regard to the hearing of musical notes. The senses, being conditioned by movements (one thinks of Plato's kinetic theory of sensations), are ever ἐν ταράχῃ and consequently fail to achieve accuracy (τὸ ἀκριβές) in their perceptions (p. 32, 23f. Düring, cf. p. 31, 6; for Platonic parallels on ταραχή, see n. 46 below); cf. Isnardi Parente, p. 318; Heinze, pp. 5–10. Having adduced this section of the *In Ptolemaei harmonica* it is only fair to point out that its trustworthiness as a witness to Xenocratean doctrine is far from certain: see H. B. Gottschalk, 'The De Audibilibus and Peripatetic Acoustics', *Hermes* 96 (1968), 450–2, but also now Isnardi Parente, pp. 314–19. Cf. K. Gaiser, *Platons ungeschriebene Lehre* (Stuttgart, 1963), p. 556 n. *ad* 72.

[46] Plato frequently describes the turmoil (ταραχή) wrought by the sensations and desires that affect the soul as a result of its entanglement in matter. A few selections suffice to illustrate what is almost a commonplace in Plato (and in later philosophers). In the analogy of soul with political tyranny in *Republic* 9 (577d–578a), the soul that is tyrannized by desires and passions loses its power of choice and is filled with turmoil (ταραχῆς, 577e2) and regret. In the treatment of sensory illusions in Bk. 10 (602cff.), the soul that is subject to errors of vision is full of turmoil of every kind (πᾶσά τις ταραχή, 602c12) which must be corrected by the (calculating) function of reason (τοῦ λογιστικοῦ ... ἔργον, 602e1; cf. earlier in Bk. 7 (524a–b), where the ἀπορία of the soul about sensations is resolved by the aid of λογισμός and νόησις; see further, Graeser, op. cit. (n. 28), pp. 102f.). In the *Phaedo* (66dff.), the contemplation of truth ultimately demands a more extreme remedy than the harmonizing of soul parts (which is the general prescription of the *Republic*, cf. e.g. 572a); pure knowledge depends upon the total separation of the soul from the body, for even the philosophical life may still be beset by tumult and turmoil (θόρυβον ... καὶ ταραχήν, 66d6) arising from the body (and its sensations, cf. 79c). As a last example, one might consider the course of reincarnation described in the *Timaeus* (42b–d1). The return to the soul's original, unfallen state requires the domination by reason (λόγῳ – *pace* Taylor) of the tumultuous and irrational mass (ὄχλον ... θορυβώδη καὶ ἄλογον) that clings to the soul from the four material elements (cf. 43b–c).

involves them in the experiences of mortals. From this, in turn, we gathered that the human soul would be made up in part of a sensitive element (the rational element, it goes without saying, would be the divine part in man); this supposition is supported by an explicit statement of Theodoret. A cursory look at the mortal soul in Plato's *Timaeus* furnished us a model which allowed us to wed the sensitive part attested by Theodoret with the irrational soul mentioned by Damascius. As there would be no point in supposing the sensitive component to be ranked separately under the irrational (which would also go against the grain of the express *αἰσθητικόν–λογικόν* division in Theodoret) or vice versa, we must conclude that Xenocrates divided the soul into a rational and a sensitive/irrational part. This is a provisional conclusion, for it cannot be absolutely ruled out that Xenocrates posited more than two parts, as Rees holds out as a possibility in light of the subdivisions of the irrational soul in the doxographical tradition.[47] Tarán in contrast, as we noted at the outset, disputes that any partition of the soul whatsoever need be inferred from Damascius, since the passage in question may merely testify to the immortality of the soul as a whole.[48] But if against both these views it can now be taken as reasonably well established that the collected evidence for Xenocrates – the testimonies of both Damascius and Theodoret, seen against the background of Plato, and the analogy of the human soul to the dual nature of daemons – suggests a basic bipartition, it remains to test the accuracy of Damascius in one further regard: the attribution of immortality to the irrational soul.

Here again the doctrine of daemons furnishes certain clues. We begin with the relatively common Greek view that each person has a daemon. This belief seems to have arisen from the notion that some external force caused good or evil in the life of men. Eventually that unknown force became internalized, as good or bad fortune was attributed to an inner daemon who took charge of a person from birth – hence the terms *εὐδαίμων* or *κακοδαίμων*, though these took on quite general meanings, e.g. 'happy' or 'unlucky'.[49] Xenocrates reasserted the etymological connection with the daemon: 'fortunate is the man who has a noble soul, for each man's soul is his daemon' (*εὐδαίμονα εἶναι τὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα σπουδαίαν· ταύτην γὰρ ἑκάστου εἶναι δαίμονα*).[50] What is important for us to note is the peculiar twist Xenocrates gives to the notion of the personal daemon, since the inner daemon was not usually identified with the soul.[51] If then, according to Xenocrates, a man's soul is his daemon

[47] Art. cit. (n. 6), 118. Yet as Rees' article itself makes clear, the division of the soul in the early Academy and in the doxographical reports is an essentially bipartite one, such as we reviewed above.

[48] 373f. Cf. Vander Waerdt, 'The Peripatetic Interpretation' (n. 38), 285 n. 5.

[49] See Wilamowitz, *Der Glaube der Hellenen* i (Berlin, 1931), pp. 368f.; E. R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley, 1951), p. 42; Burkert, op. cit. (n. 21), p. 181.

[50] Arist. *Top.* 112ª37–8 (fr. 81 H = 236 IP; Heinze, p. 144, takes the *γάρ* clause as Aristotle's addition, though I rather think it belongs to Xenocrates; so apparently also Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism* (n. 19), p. 14, and already Krische, op. cit. (n. 15), p. 321; cf. Isnardi Parente, p. 421); cf. fr. 83 H = 239 IP. This excerpt along with *Top.* 152ª7–9 (fr. 82 H = 240 IP) most likely comes from one of Xenocrates' many ethical treatises (the obvious choice would be the two books of the *Περὶ εὐδαιμονίας*, D.L. 4.12). On the critical context in which Aristotle cites Xenocrates in the *Topics*, see Cherniss, op. cit. pp. 13f. See further, Krämer, op. cit. (n. 10), p. 172 n. 278; Brenk, *In Mist Apparalled* (*n.* 21), *p.* 93 *n.* 9.

[51] *Cf. Herter, op. cit.* (*n.* 23), *p.* 139 (= *Kl. Schr.* 71) with literature in n. 100; Rohde, op. cit. (n. 23), ii. 316 n. 1; J. Daniélou, 'Démon, démonologie platonicienne et néo-platonicienne', *Dictionnaire de spiritualité*, iii (Paris, 1957), col. 153. In the background of Xenocrates' mind may lie not only Empedocles DK 31 B 115 (see J. Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers*, ii (London, 1979), pp. 196–9), but also Democritus DK 68 B 170 and 171 (on the context of B 171 in Democritus' ethics, see C. H. Kahn, 'Democritus and the Origins of Moral Psychology',

while he lives in a body, it would follow that when he is divested of his body his soul remains a daemon, only more starkly revealed as such.[52] That daemons are departed souls is not explicitly attested for Xenocrates' daemonology, but is virtually assured as a Xenocratean tenet from Plutarch, *Def. or.* 417b: 'For there are also among daemons, as among men, different degrees of virtue, and in some there is still a weak and faint remnant, the dregs, so to speak, of the affective and irrational, while in others it is great and difficult to quench' (*εἰσὶ γάρ, ὡς ἐν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ δαίμοσιν ἀρετῆς διαφοραὶ καὶ τοῦ παθητικοῦ καὶ ἀλόγου τοῖς μὲν ἀσθενὲς καὶ ἀμαυρὸν ἔτι λείψανον ὥσπερ περίττωμα,*[53] *τοῖς δὲ πολὺ καὶ δυσκατάσβεστον ἔνεστιν*).[54] The participation of daemons in the nature of the human soul and in human affection, of which we spoke earlier, turns out to be self-explanatory in light of this passage: the human soul becomes a daemon after death, and the survival of the soul's affective element from its earthly sojourn provides an abiding link between the daemon-soul

AJPh 106 (1985), 12ff.). In Plato's *Tim.* 90a3, c5, the God-given daemon is the divine part of the soul residing in the head (cf. Graeser, op. cit. (n. 28), p. 86; Dodds, op. cit. (n. 49), p. 213 n. 31). Xenocrates differs in so far as he seems to equate the daemon with the soul *in toto*.

[52] The belief that exceptional mortals became *δαίμονες* after death crops up repeatedly in Greek literature, beginning with Hesiod (*Erga* 122–6), while the dead in general are referred to as daemons in sepulchral inscriptions of the Hellenistic period. See Burkert, op. cit. (n. 21), p. 181; cf. Wilamowitz, op. cit. (n. 49), i. 366; Roscher, s.v. 'Daimon' (i. 938); Herter, op. cit. (n. 23), pp. 139f. (= *Kl. Schr.* 70f.); G. H. R. Horsley, *New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity, ii* (1982), p. 51. On cults of the dead seen as cults to daemons, see Rohde, op. cit. (n. 23), i. 246ff. Damascius rejected as un-Platonic the notion that soul would pass into a daemon, angel, or god (*In Phd.* 175 [*ad* 69e2], p. 107 Westerink (n. 4); see Westerink's note ad loc.). About Xenocrates' daemonology, however, one may still wonder why he retained, in addition to the daemon of departed souls, those traditional types of daemons who never were human souls; cf. Brenk, *In Mist Apparalled* (n. 21), p. 93. The same question applies to Plutarch's daemons; see Dillon, op. cit. (n. 10), pp. 223–4. In the later daemonology of Proclus, daemons by nature (*φύσει*) are ontologically distinguished from daemons by relation (*σχέσει*); see D. J. O'Meara, *Pythagoras Revived* (Oxford, 1989), p. 151.

[53] Since *περίττωμα* generally designates a product or residuum of the body, such as an excretion or a secretion, Plutarch's use of it here to describe the post-mortem soul makes for a particularly suggestive simile.

[54] Fr. 24 H = 227 IP. Heinze, pp. 81ff., has shown that chs. 13–15 (416d–418a) of the *Def. or.* derive from Xenocrates. R. M. Jones, *The Platonism of Plutarch* (diss. Chicago, 1913; repr. New York and London, 1980), p. 29, cautiously concurs with Heinze on this point. The salient factors seem to me to be these: 1. the explanation in *Def. or.* 417b of the differences in virtue that obtain among daemons as among men (*εἰσὶ γάρ, ὡς ἐν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ δαίμοσιν ἀρετῆς διαφοραί*) in terms of the different degrees of intensity by which affective and irrational elements still cling to daemons, is a variation of the similar theory expounded in *Is. et Os.* 360e, which is part of a Xenocratean section (see n. 24 above): the daemons' participation in the sensory human soul and their resultant susceptibility to affections explain the different degrees of virtue and vice (*γίνονται γὰρ ὡς ἐν ἀνθρώποις καὶ δαίμοσιν ἀρετῆς διαφοραὶ καὶ κακίας*); 2. Plutarch's closing remark to this passage, 'there are in many places sacrifices, rituals, and myths (*μυθολογίαι*) that preserve and carefully maintain the scattered traces and signs of these things' (i.e. the involvement of daemons in sacred ceremonies and mysteries (417a) and the nature of daemons, just described), recalls the quasi-theodicy of *Is. et Os.* chs. 25 and 26 (360dff.); there it seems to be largely Xenocrates' interpretation that the stories about Typhon, Osiris, and Isis, about the Giants and Titans, the lawless deeds of Kronus, etc., which are told in myth (*μυθολογούμενα*), as well as those things veiled in mysteries and rites, pertain to the experiences (*παθήματα*) of neither gods nor men but daemons; 3. the connection between these sections of the *Def. or.* and *Is. et Os.* and their common source in Xenocrates finds as close a confirmation as one could demand in *Def. or.* 417c: the mysteries reveal the truth about daemons, and the festivals associated with the eating of raw flesh, the rending of victims, fasting, beating of the breast, and profanity are not rites performed for gods but for the turning away of evil daemons. The apotropaic function of practices such as these is expressly cited as part of Xenocrates' daemonology in *Is. et Os.* 361b; see n. 23 above; cf. Soury, op. cit. (n. 21), pp. 51, 55.

and human experience.[55] The 'remnant of the affective and irrational' is equivalent to the sensitive/irrational part of the soul spoken of by Theodoret and Damascius.

The survival of the lower, irrational soul after death is, however, not necessarily the same as true, i.e. eternally unending, immortality, which is clearly the claim (*ἀπαθανατίζουσιν*) in Damascius. Unfortunately, except for its involvement in daemonic nature, the fate of the disembodied soul is not known to us in any manner that could be unambiguously ascribed to Xenocrates. Heinze, while admitting this limitation, nonetheless pieced together a rather detailed reconstruction of the experiences of the post-mortem soul from the eschatological myth in Plutarch's *De facie in orbe lunae*, chs. 27ff. (942d ff.).[56] The itinerary of the soul as told by Plutarch is complex and involves several *rites de passage*. A threefold anthropological conception governs his account; man is composed of body, soul, and intellect (*νοῦς*), supplied by the earth, the moon, and the sun respectively (943a).[57] All souls after the 'first death' – the separation of intellect and soul from body – must wander between earth and moon. Here unjust souls are punished, good souls pass a certain time in the gentlest part of the air, 'the fields of Hades', until purged of bodily pollutions (943c).[58] From this intermediate Hades those souls who already in life had subdued

[55] Cf. Heinze, p. 83, on *Def. or.* 417b: 'Daraus folgt doch wohl, daß die Dämonen einst Menschenseelen waren: denn ein *λεύψανον* kann das Unvernünftige nur aus dem irdischen Leben der Seele sein' (this, incidentally, seems also to have been Werner Jaeger's conviction; in his copy of Heinze's *Xenokrates*, which I am here using, he crossed out 'doch wohl' and inserted 'sicherlich' in the margin); cf. also J. ter Vrugt-Lentz in *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*, ix, col. 614 (s.v. 'Geister [Dämonen]: B. II. Vorhellenistisches Griechenland'); similarly, Dillon, op. cit. (n. 10), p. 223. For opposing views, see H. von Arnim, *Plutarch über Dämonen und Mantik* (Amsterdam, 1921), pp. 62f.; T. Eisele, *AGPh* 17 (1904), 43f.; Brenk, 'In the Light of the Moon' (n. 21), 2126 (though in 'An Imperial Heritage' (n. 21) Brenk says that Xenocrates may have viewed daemons as disembodied human souls). According to Isnardi Parente, p. 418, Xenocrates' daemon-soul represents a juxtaposition (rather than 'una reale sutura') of the cosmological daemonology of Philip of Opus and the psychological, religious daemonology of a more traditional Pythagorean–Platonic type. The Pythagorean influences upon both Plato's and Xenocrates' daemonology are neglected by Heinze, but in correcting this omission, M. Detienne (*La Notion de daïmôn dans le pythagorisme ancien* (Paris, 1963), cf. id. 'Xénocrate et la démonologie pythagoricienne', *RÉA* 60 (1958), 271–9) has overemphasized the Pythagorean (and often pseudo-Pythagorean) origins of the belief that human souls are daemons and become lunary daemons after death; he consequently minimizes the important role of Xenocrates in systematizing and incorporating daemons within the hierarchy of Academic ontology; see W. Burkert, *Gnomon* 36 (1964), 563–7.

[56] See Heinze, pp. 123–47. Besides using the myth of the *Fac. lun.*, Heinze, pp. 102f., 128ff., also draws on the Timarchus myth in *Gen. Socr.* ch. 22 (590bff.). In both texts Heinze believed he was able to separate neatly the Platonic, Xenocratean, and Poseidonian sources, but it has been shown, notably by Jones, op. cit. (n. 54), pp. 30–3, 48–63 (cf. id., 'Posidonius and Solar Eschatology', *CP* 27 [1932], 113–35; reprinted in *Platonism of Plutarch* (n. 54), that although these two accounts evidence some Stoic influences, they are primarily based upon Plato, especially the *Timaeus*. See further H. Cherniss's survey in his introduction to the Loeb edn. of the *Fac. lun.*, *Plutarch's Moralia*, xii (Cambridge and London, 1957), pp. 22ff.; H. Görgemanns, *Untersuchungen zu Plutarch's Dialog De facie in orbe lunae* (Heidelberg, 1970), p. 80 n. 117. Cf. n. 57 below and Appendix.

[57] The body–soul–intellect schematization ultimately goes back to Plato; see Cherniss, op. cit. (n. 56), n. c, p. 197; J. Pépin, *Idées grecques sur l'homme et sur Dieu* (Paris, 1971), p. 94 n. 1; Deuse, op. cit. (n. 1), pp. 45f. Cf. the myth in *Gen. Socr.* 591d–e (on problems of consistency in Plutarch's views of *nous* in *Gen. Socr.* and elsewhere, see Deuse, op. cit. (n. 1), pp. 46f.; see also Brenk, 'An Imperial Heritage' (n. 21), 530–2; J. M. Dillon, '"Orthodoxy" and "Eclecticism": Middle Platonists and Neo-Pythagoreans' in J. M. Dillon and A. A. Long (eds.), *The Question of 'Eclecticism'* (Berkeley, 1988), pp. 109–13). See also Appendix.

[58] On 'the fields of Hades' as a purgatory, see Soury, op. cit. (n. 21), pp. 187f., Brenk, 'An Imperial Heritage' (n. 21), 284. Plutarch does not specify what sort of punishment unjust and intemperate souls undergo; reincarnation seems to be the fate of the souls who reach the moon

by reason the irrational and affective part of the soul proceed to the moon and gain a firm footing there (cf. *Quaest. Rom.* 282a); they then behold its greatness and beauty (943d–944c). As part of the description of the moon, Plutarch introduces Xenocrates' view on the elements and different densities that compose the sun and the stars, the moon, and the earth; emphasis is given to the moon's mixed substance – composed of neither pure density nor pure subtility – which makes it 'receptive of soul' (*ψυχῆς δεκτικόν*).[59] As Plutarch's account continues, it becomes apparent that souls are equated with daemons only after they have attained the moon. Eventually they are judged according to how well or badly they have exercised their daemonic functions (presiding over oracles, participating in mystic rites, etc.).[60] Bad daemons are condemned to rebirth; good daemons achieve 'the best alteration' (*ἡ ἀρίστη ἐξαλλαγή*), which is the attainment of full divinity and is effected by the separation of intellect from soul – the 'second death'.[61] The substance of the soul is absorbed into the moon, the proper element (*στοιχεῖον*) of soul.

Plutarch's myth, given here in a highly condensed version, mentions Xenocrates only in connection with the substances that compose the moon and the other planets. More than this may go back to Xenocrates, and many of the claims that Heinze makes for Xenocrates are not in themselves implausible, but it should be frankly recognized that whatever is garnered for Xenocrates from the *Fac. lun.* is conjectural.[62] None the less some minimal observations can be made that may indeed help to illuminate Xenocrates' beliefs about the afterlife of the soul.

Souls become daemons and dwell in the *aer* below the moon. We know that Xenocrates spoke of sublunary daemons and that he equated the *aer* between earth and moon with Hades.[63] But the sublunary Hades, as the lunary regions in Plutarch's

but fall again into the deep, while those who cling unsuccessfully to the moon are swept once more into Hades (943d, cf. *Gen. Socr.* 591c). Reincarnation appears again, as we shall observe shortly, as a punishment at the later judgment of souls after they have become daemons. Soury, op. cit. (n. 21), pp. 190ff. has tried to categorize three different classes of souls and their respective fates.

[59] 943f–944a (fr. 56 H = 161 IP); see n. 16 above. Although Plutarch adduces Xenocrates, his account of the constituent elements of the physical bodies is not in all points identical with Xenocrates'; see v. Arnim, op. cit. (n. 55), pp. 53f.

[60] The judgment takes place in the 'gulf of Hecate', which Plutarch describes a little earlier as part of the topographical description of the moon (944c). Here Plutarch also makes clear that souls render or demand satisfaction for what they have suffered or done only after having become daemons (*ἤδη γεγενημέναι δαίμονες*). Cf. Cherniss, op. cit. (n. 56), n. a, p. 210.

[61] Plutarch also uses the term *μεταβολή* for the transformation of daemons (or mortals) to gods; see *Pelop.* 16.8, *Def. or.* 415b; N. Aujoulat, *Le Néo-platonisme Alexandrin, Hiéroclès d'Alexandrie* (Leiden, 1986), p. 180. Whether he also meant it to refer to the change of daemons to men, i.e. reincarnation (so Heinze, pp. 110, 138), is less certain. Notwithstanding *Def. or.* 438d, where Plutarch refers to some (unknown) thinkers who hold that the things above the moon undergo *μεταβολαί* and *παλιγγενεσίαι*, in the two passages where *μεταβολαί* might be thought to refer to the incarnation of daemons, *Is. et Os.* 360e and *Def. or.* 416c (both quoted above n. 24), the changes seem rather to indicate those wrought in the psyche by the vicissitudinous nature of affections such as pleasure and pain, to which the soul is subject as long as it is involved with matter. But once daemons achieve the final transformation to gods, they are relieved of any further changes because, as Plutarch says elsewhere, the divine, being immaterial, does not undergo constraints, chances, and changes (*ἀνάγκαι, τύχαι, μεταβολαί*); see *Ad princ. inerud.* 781f; cf. *E ap. Delph.* 394a, *Quaes. conviv.* 717e, *An. proc.* 1015e.

[62] The closing part of the myth (945c), describing the function of the three Fates and their relation to sun, moon, and earth, may be an adaptation from Xenocrates (n. 17 above); see Dörrie, op. cit. (n. 4), pp. 291–3; cf. Cherniss, op. cit. (n. 56), n. b, p. 221.

[63] The idea of a celestial Hades owes its increasing prominence in the Hellenistic period to advances in astronomy coupled with beliefs in astral immortality. The acceptance of the sphericity of the earth and the divine nature of the heavenly bodies, which revolved in orderly

Fac. lun., would have been no more than a sojourn for the daemon-soul.[64] What happened here would depend upon the remnant of the affective (or sensitive) and irrational element that still adhered to the soul. The souls in whom the παθητικόν (or αἰσθητικόν) remained strong would be prone as daemons to indulge their appetites and desires for the transient, sensory-based experiences of humans, especially of the kind practised at certain festivals. These souls are the evil daemons. In Plutarch's myth daemons who perform their daemonic functions with anger, injustice, or envy pay the penalty by being thrust again into human bodies (*Fac. lun.* 944d). Reincarnation does seem the natural punishment for daemons who have continued to nourish their affective/sensitive element, and we may assume the same fate for the evil daemons in Xenocrates. On the other hand, those souls in whom this element brought from their corporeal existence is weak to begin with, as a result of having lived a philosophical life and having quelled the παραχώδες arising from the body (cf. fr. 4), would become good daemons. Similarly, in Plutarch's *Fac. lun.*, souls that gain a firm footing on the moon and parade about there as victors have in their lives made the irrational and affective part of the soul fairly orderly and tractable to reason (943d).[65]

Plutarch, though, as we noted earlier, allows souls to become daemons only after they have undergone a period of purgation in the sublunary *aer* and reached the moon, where after a time they will be judged again for their daemonic activities. There is no compelling reason to think these stages had all been part of Xenocrates' eschatology, whereas nothing prevents us from supposing that souls become daemons immediately after separation from the body.[66] Some daemons, retaining a stronger

fashion around the earth (the Pythagorean/Philolaic source of these ideas, as set forth by Dicks, op. cit. (n. 16), pp. 72f., is disputed; see J. S. Morrison, *CR* 21 (1971), 227; Burkert, op. cit. (n. 8), pp. 337–50), gave scientific credence, as it were, to the notion that perfection resides 'above' and would have largely supplanted the old picture of a subterrestial Hades as the way station or destination of departed souls. See Burkert, ibid. pp. 357–68; cf. F. Buffière, *Les Mythes d'Homère et la pensée grecque* (Paris, 1956), pp. 496ff. But it might also be observed that to the extent that Xenocrates makes earth and water part of the sublunary realm and accessible to daemons, our world here below is already Hades; cf. P. Boyancé, 'La Religion astrale de Platon à Cicéron', *RÉG* 65 (1952), 334.

[64] Already Heraclides Ponticus spoke of a heavenly Hades, the Milky Way, in which discarnate souls tarry between incarnations or through which they pass in their ascent to the higher gods (Heraclides may also have posited a sublunary Hades for the punishment of the wicked); see frr. 96 and 97 Wehrli; Burkert, op. cit. (n. 8), p. 367; H. B. Gottschalk, *Heraclides of Pontus* (Oxford, 1980), pp. 100ff.

[65] Cf. *Gen. Socr.* 592b–c; *Virt. mor.* 445b.

[66] Heinze, p. 139 (cf. p. 95), maintained that Xenocrates, as a pupil of Plato, would not have let souls become daemons right upon death, for they would first have to be punished for their earthly sins in the *aer* between earth and moon. Their punishment could not consist of rebirth, since then the process of reincarnation would only come to an end with the complete purification of the soul, and the evil passions of daemons would be inexplicable. This line of reasoning, however, is not necessarily convincing and appears to me at variance with some of Heinze's own postulates derived from Plato. We do not know what motivation Xenocrates gave for the soul's first incarnation, but we may assume with Heinze (pp. 145f.) that embodiment was a matter of fate and necessity for every soul, as in the *Timaeus* (41e2–42a4), and not the result of some misfortune or sin incurred by certain souls in their pre-existent state, as e.g. in the *Phaedrus* (248c). Xenocrates could not have adopted the latter alternative, since *all* daemons, if our reconstruction of his daemonology is correct, retain some share of the nature of the human soul. What then should stand in the way of souls from becoming daemons upon death? The evil passions of certain daemons result from the stronger remnant of the sensitive and irrational element, which would in turn render them subject to reincarnation, though each sojourn upon earth would also provide an opportunity to bring the lower elements of the soul under control of reason and thus bring about an eventual release from the cycle of rebirth (cf. *Tim.* 42b2–d1). Good daemon-souls would never have to undergo reincarnation in the first place.

propensity for the material world and sensory affections, would be drawn to rebirth, while others would eventually be freed from the affective/irrational element, especially if it was weak and not further indulged during their tenure as daemons. The rational (*τὸ λογικόν*) or divine part (*τὸ θεῖον*) of these daemons would now be *ἀμιγές* and *ἄκρατον* (cf. n. 24 above) and so ready to rejoin pure intellect. We do not know in exactly what terms Xenocrates described the soul's attainment of immortality.[67] We do know, however, that he posited mind as the highest god (see p. 145 above). Since the divine *nous* would have been the source of man's intellect,[68] it stands to reason that the immortality of the soul would consist in the soul's return to the intelligible realm after shedding its lower remnant. This residuum consisting of the affective/irrational part was probably absorbed into the substance of the moon, which Plutarch after Xenocrates termed 'receptive of soul'.[69]

The path to immortality thus includes an intervening stage during which the soul sloughs off its lower elements or is compelled by these to a new birth, which would postpone its final immortalization. In either event, Xenocrates will have given the sensitive, irrational part of the soul an indeterminate period of survival after death. This apparently allowed Damascius or his source to claim that Xenocrates extended the soul's immortality to the irrational part, though of course the post-mortem existence of the irrational soul, as we have tried to reconstruct it above, is not true immortality, since it eventually faces dissolution.

IV

Our preceding attempts to reconstruct Xenocrates' view of the soul have sought to shed light on Xenocrates' thought itself, but we should be remiss in our account if we did not also point to the possible significance of Xenocrates' psychology for the history of later Platonism. In so far as Xenocrates based his doctrine of daemons – a subject only broached by Plato – on a twofold nature of the soul, he will have lent support to Middle- and Neoplatonic explication of Platonic psychology in terms of bipartition. Although Plato's dialogues treat the nature of the individual soul from different perspectives and on the whole therefore present a complex view of the soul, the *Timaeus* may be singled out as the dialogue that most readily permits a conception of the soul as divided into higher and lower elements. But if, as here suggested, the *Timaeus* proved seminal for the bipartite structuring of the soul in Xenocrates and later Platonists, it must also be acknowledged that in the *Timaeus* the inferior component of the soul, as the locus of irrational sensation, the passions, etc. is decidedly mortal (*θνητόν*) and does not survive the dissolution of the body, whereas in Xenocrates the sensitive/irrational part does exist for a while sundered from the

[67] See Appendix.

[68] A doxographical snippet carries the same import: *Πυθαγόρας Ἀναξαγόρας Πλάτων Ξενοκράτης Κλεάνθες θύραθεν εἰσκρίνεσθαι τὸν νοῦν*, Aët. 4.5.11 (Diels, *Dox. gr.* 392); fr. 69 H = 205 IP. Cf. Arist. *G.A.* 736^{b}27; thereto, D. W. Ross (ed.), *Aristotle, De Anima* (Oxford, 1961), p. 42; W. K. C. Guthrie, 'Plato's Views on the Nature of the Soul', *Recherches sur la tradition platonicienne* (Entretiens sur l'antiquité classique, iii. Vandœvres-Geneva, 1955), 19.

[69] As Plutarch puts it (*Fac. lun.* 945a–b), the process of dissolution is quick for temperate souls who have loved a leisurely, quiet, and philosophical life, whereas ambitious and active souls are drawn by their restlessness and fondness for the body to another birth. The moon tries to restrain this latter class of souls in order to prevent them from being reborn as mindless monsters.

body. Certainly other dialogues of Plato played a role in Xenocrates' portrayal of the lower soul and its survival after death. One thinks especially of the *Phaedrus* and the *Phaedo*. In the *Phaedrus* (246aff.), the pre-existent soul, likened to the united force (*ξυμφύτῳ δυνάμει*) of a pair of winged horses and charioteer, has by reason of the evil horse an inclination for earthly existence that may cause its fall from heaven. In the *Phaedo* (81c ff.), the departed soul of an impure person is 'interpenetrated by the corporeal' (*διειλημμένην... ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματοειδοῦς*), which is 'inherent' (*ξύμφυτον*) in the soul through its life-long association with the body;[70] hence some souls wander about their tombs until imprisoned again in a body. While it is indisputably Plato's conviction that the soul, as the true and rational self, and as the divine, pure, and immortal part in man, is immaterial,[71] he none the less on manifold occasions, in both eschatological myths and discursive arguments, speaks of the discarnate soul as partially tainted by a corporeal and irrational element. Since the dialogues do not yield a single, uniform doctrine of the soul,[72] except for the tenet of its ultimate immortality, we cannot assert that Xenocrates in bestowing a post-mortem existence upon the sensitive/irrational element departs from Platonic teaching taken as a whole. He does, however, depart from the specific teaching of the *Timaeus* on the lower soul, and will therefore have added material for the debates among later Platonists that were largely centred on precisely this problem of the inferior, irrational soul and its fate in the return of the soul to *nous* (or the One). The problem of course was bequeathed by Plato himself, whose writings, as we noted, do not always speak with one voice about the nature and fate of the soul. At the same time, it is difficult to imagine that the tradition of Platonic interpretation should have ignored the eschatological statements about the soul made by Plato's second successor, especially given that Xenocrates was reckoned an important exegete and apologist of Platonic dogma.[73]

After Antiochus issued his call 'to follow the ancients', by which he meant Plato and his three immediate successors as well as Aristotle and Theophrastus,[74] there ensued among Platonists, in place of the sceptical philosophizing initiated by Arcesilaus, a renewed emphasis on straightforward, and eventually dogmatic, explication of Plato's writings.[75] The *Timaeus* in particular gained prominence in the

[70] See Gallop (n. 14), ad loc. (p. 143).

[71] Plato often emphasizes these attributes of the soul in conjunction with its being *μονοειδής* (see e.g. *Phd.* 80b), which, according to Graeser, op. cit. (n. 28), pp. 58f. (with further references), signifies the soul's affinity to the uniform world of Ideas.

[72] Cf. Heinze, pp. 140–1; P. Merlan in A. H. Armstrong (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1970), p. 28; Robinson, op. cit. (n. 28), p. 131.

[73] *Σπεύσιππος... Ξενοκράτην ἀντ' αὐτοῦ κατέστησε τῶν Πλατωνικῶν δογμάτων ἐξηγητήν.* ps.-Galen, *Hist. philos.* 3 (Diels, *Dox. gr.* 599, 14–17) = T 12 Tarán (see also Tarán's commt., p. 211); *ὁ Ξενοκράτης ὑπεραπολογούμενος τοῦ Πλάτωνος....* ps.-Alex. Aphr. *In Arist. Met.* N. 4 1091[a]27, p. 819, 37 Hayduck (fr. 33 H = fr. 116 IP). But cf. Numenius' evaluation of the Early Academy and especially of Xenocrates in Eus. *PE* 14.4.16ff. = fr. 24 Des Places (*Numénius, Fragments* (Paris, 1973)), on which see Tarán, p. 215. On Xenocrates' *Timaeus* exegesis and its possible influence upon Middleplatonic tradition, cf. H. J. Krämer, 'Zur geschichtlichen Stellung der aristotelischen Metaphysik', *Kant Stud.* 58 (1967), 328ff., id., 'Grundfragen der aristotelischen Theologie', *Th & Ph* 44 (1969), 484ff.

[74] See Dörrie, op. cit. (n. 4), p. 173; Dillon, op. cit. (n. 10), pp. 55ff.

[75] It is far from certain how much of the renewal of Platonism, save for the break from Academic Scepticism, can be traced directly to Antiochus. The valuation of Antiochus is controversial in three regards: 1. his status as a bona fide Platonist; 2. his own use of Plato's writings; 3. his influence upon subsequent developments in Platonism. See Dörrie, op. cit. (n. 4),

first century B.C. (and not only among Platonists).[76] Crantor in the third century had commented on the Atlantis myth;[77] but thereafter we know of no *Timaeus* commentary until Eudorus of Alexandria (*fl.* 20 B.C.).[78] While the central theme of *Timaeus* interpretations seems to have been the literal creation of the cosmos in time,[79] it is a likely assumption that questions also arose concerning the parts and immortality of the soul – perhaps as derivative questions from discussions about the nature of the world-soul. In view of the activity now surrounding the *Timaeus*, which explicitly teaches the mortality of the lower soul (69c–e), it is not surprising that the bipartite schema of λογικόν–ἄλογον should be the prevailing conception, with immortality being denied the irrational part. This was the working model for Philo of Alexandria in the first century A.D., probably following Eudorus, and the natural interpretation of the *Timaeus* in the didactic treatise of ps.-Timaeus Locrus, which belongs to the same milieu and time-frame as Eudorus and Philo.[80] Since not only in Alexandrian Platonism but in Middle- and Neoplatonism generally the bipartition of the soul into rational and irrational was commonly accepted, there would be little purpose in listing the authors who refer to it; more pertinent for our attempt to find possible connections with Xenocrates is to single out those authors who, in the words of Damascius, 'extend immortality' or at any rate a form thereof, to the lower, irrational soul.

Alcinoos is worth mentioning, even though he argues that the irrational soul is mortal.[81] But in the course of his argument he makes it clear that the immortality of irrational souls had become a disputed issue (τοῦτο τῶν ἀμφισβητουμένων) by the second century, if not earlier.[82] Similarly in Athens the emphasis placed by Atticus on the immortality of the soul as the unifying bond (τὸ συνέχον) of the Platonic school betrays the possibility that he feared this bond was becoming frayed as Platonists were expounding the master's teaching on the soul in different and perhaps not always

pp. 172–4; id., *Von Platon zum Platonismus* (Opladen, 1976), pp. 14–15, 46; further literature in Deuse, op. cit. (n. 1), p. 8 n. 2. See also now J. Barnes, 'Antiochus of Ascalon' in M. Griffin and J. Barnes (eds.), *Philosophia Togata* (Oxford, 1989), pp. 51–96.

[76] Dörrie, op. cit. (n. 75), pp. 32ff., explains the impulses that governed the revived interest in the *Timaeus*.

[77] So Proclus (*In Tim.* i.75.30–76.2 Diehl), who calls Crantor ὁ πρῶτος τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐξηγητής (but cf. ps. Galen, n. 73 above).

[78] The evidence for Eudorus' comments on the *Timaeus* derives mainly from references in Plutarch's *An. proc.* On the gap in *Timaeus* commentaries between Crantor and Eudorus, see M. Baltes (comm.), *Timaios Lokros, Über die Natur des Kosmos und der Seele* (Leiden, 1972), p. 26 n. 1.

[79] Dörrie, op. cit. (n. 4), pp. 174f., and in detail, M. Baltes, *Die Weltenstehung des platonischen Timaios nach den antiken Interpreten* i (Leiden, 1976), pp. 23ff.

[80] Philo, *De spec. leg.* 1.333 et al.; see further, Dillon, op. cit. (n. 10), pp. 174ff.; Tim. Locr. *De natura mundi et animae* (ed. W. Marg (Leiden, 1972), 218. 5f. (also see Baltes, op. cit. (n. 78), ad loc.), cf. 224.3f. Baltes, ibid. 20ff., esp. 25, considers the Timaeus Locrus a product of the school of Eudorus, but also admits the possibility of its dating to the first century A.D.; cf. Dillon, op. cit. (n. 10), 131; T. H. Tobin (text, trans., and notes), *Timaios of Locri, On the Nature of the World and the Soul* (Chico, 1985), 7.

[81] For Alcinoos' argument on the immortality of the soul see ch. 25 of the *Didaskalikos* (= 177–8 in the Budé edition of J. Whittaker (Paris, 1990), who for reference retains Hermann's pagination but uses his own line numbers). Alcinoos considers irrational souls mortal and perishable since they are altogether without a conception of the noetic nature and even of a different οὐσία than rational souls (178, 30–2 Whittaker). See further, Deuse, op. cit. (n. 1), pp. 91–5. On the controversy of the name, Alcinoos or Albinus, I tentatively side with Whittaker for Alcinoos and a date for the *Didaskalikos* anywhere between the reign of Augustus and the middle of the second century (Whittaker, op. cit., pp. vii–xiii).

[82] 178, 26 Whittaker.

mutually reconcilable ways.[83] Atticus' own pupil, Harpocration of Argos, exemplifies this state of affairs: whereas Atticus follows the *Timaeus* and calls the irrational soul mortal,[84] Harpocration took Plato's ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος (*Phdr.* 245c) to include the souls of flies and ants.[85] Such a comprehensive notion of immortality points to the Neopythagorean influence of Numenius, with whom Harpocration is often linked in our sources.[86]

Numenius based his psychology on the postulate of two world-souls, a good and an evil one, the latter associated with matter.[87] Hence, on the anthropological level, Numenius spoke not of parts of the soul, whether two or three, but rather of two disparate souls, rational and irrational (fr. 44 Des Places). The irrational soul is formed even before the soul becomes fully incarnate, for in the path of the soul's descent through the heavenly spheres (the transformation of *nous* into soul) it takes on matter from the evil world-soul; the evil (κακία) that accrues to the rational soul becomes the material, irrational soul.[88] At death the irrational soul continues in a discarnate state – a conception for which Xenocrates may at least be partly responsible. Numenius, however, went so far as to apply this state not only to the irrational but also to the vegetative soul (ἡ φυτική), because, as Philoponus puts it, he was led astray (πλανηθείς) by Plato's statement that 'all soul is immortal' (fr. 47 Des Places); we have already seen Harpocration give a similarly generous interpretation to the *Phaedrus* passage. Here it is appropriate to return for a moment to our excerpt from Damascius (p. 143 above = fr. 46a Des Places) in which it is said that Numenius extends immortality ἄχρι τῆς ἐμψύχου ἕξεως. The precise meaning of ἔμψυχος ἕξις is subject to dispute, but, on the face of it and in view of the progression that follows for the other philosophers (φύσις–ἀλογία–λογική–νοῦς), the phrase would seem to indicate the lowest level in the hierarchy of being at which ensoulment is possible.[89] It is at any rate clear that Numenius went further in the extension of immortality than Xenocrates (μέχρι τῆς ἀλογίας).[90] But in the case of both authors, Damascius' use of ἀπαθανατίζουσιν is not literally correct. We learn from Numenius' description of the re-ascent of souls that the constellation Capricorn dissolves the life that souls led among men and only admits their deathless and divine life (here 'life'

[83] Eus. *PE* 15.9.1–2 = fr. 7 Des Places. Here Atticus also reveals that there had arisen a great deal of ambitious rivalry (πολλὴ ... ἡ φιλοτιμία) among Plato's disciples in the contest to defend his dogma. Cf. n. 1 above.

[84] See Proclus, *In Tim.* iii. 234, 8–18 Diehl. On this important passage, which also mentions Albinus, see n. 95 below. Cf. A.-J. Festugière (trans. and notes), *Proclus: commentaire sur le Timée* (Paris, 1968), v. 99 n. 1.

[85] This is from the oft-cited reference in Hermeias, *In Plat. Phdr.* p. 102, 13–14 Couvreur; thereto see J. Dillon, 'Harpocration's Commentary on Plato; Fragments of a Middle Platonic Commentary', *CSCA* 4 (1971), 139ff.

[86] See Dillon, op. cit. (n. 10), pp. 258ff.

[87] Fr. 52, 64–74 Des Places; see Deuse, op. cit. (n. 1), pp. 67f.

[88] Fr. 43 in conjunction with frr. 49 and 52 Des Places; see Deuse, op. cit. (n. 1), pp. 77ff. Numenius' theory of elements that accrue to the descending soul from matter (προσφυομένων ... ἀπὸ ... τῆς ὕλης, fr. 43, 8–9) harbingers the idea of the vehicle of the soul which was developed into an elaborate doctrine in Neoplatonism; cf. Des Places, op. cit. (n. 73), p. 122 n. 3 (*ad* fr. 43); Dillon, op. cit. (n. 10), p. 376; see further, n. 92 below.

[89] Plants and animals would in any case be included. Dörrie, op. cit. (n. 4), p. 426 adduces as parallel fr. 53 Des Places in which Numenius says that Sarapis (as a type of universal deity) shares in the being of all the animals and plants cared for by nature. See further Deuse, op. cit. (n. 1), pp. 77–9, with a survey of the various interpretations given ἐμψύχου ἕξις at p. 77 n. 49.

[90] As Dörrie, op. cit. (n. 4), p. 426, says about the doxographical list in Damascius: 'Dabei ist die Anordnung so getroffen, daß diejenigen, die der Unsterblichkeit den weitesten Raum geben, zuerst genannt werden; dieser Rahmen verengt sich dann von Position zu Position.'

is tantamount to the life of the irrational and rational soul).[91] Similarly in Xenocrates we observed that the irrational/sensitive part of the soul probably dissolved into the substance of the moon and is therefore also not strictly immortal.

Remote resemblances to Xenocrates' psychology may also be detected in the post-Plotinian doctrine of the chariot or vehicle (ὄχημα) of the soul.[92] Fundamental to this theory is the idea that the soul in its descent takes on matter from the heavenly spheres or the stars which functions as its vehicle for the further journey to earthly existence as well as for the return of the soul to its divine source in the intelligible realm. Plato had related how the demiurge mounted the souls, each upon a star ὡς ἐς ὄχημα (*Tim.* 41e), and Aristotle had likened the πνεῦμα, the warm substance transmitted in the procreative act and serving as the locus of the nutritive, sensitive, and imaginative soul, to the element of which the stars were made (*GA* 736^{b}37–8).[93] These and other passages from Plato and Aristotle, though obviously providing only the most tenuous foothold for the Neoplatonic teaching of the ὄχημα-πνεῦμα (also called the πνευματικὸν ὄχημα, αὐγοειδὲς σῶμα, and various other names and combinations thereof[94]), nevertheless invested it with a measure of authority. It is not known who first linked Plato's ὄχημα and Aristotle's πνεῦμα, but by the third century A.D. the doctrine seems to have been well established.[95] Although Plotinus had little use for the ὄχημα-πνεῦμα as such, his pupil Porphyry gave it a dominant role in his philosophy of soul. The *pneuma*-body, composed of several elements from the planets, serves as the vehicle for the irrational soul which forms during the passage of the soul through

[91] Fr. 35, 21–3 Des Places. For ἡ ἐν ἀνδράσι ζωή = ἄλογος ψυχή Des Places, op. cit. (n. 73), p. 119 n. 7 (*ad.* fr. 35), refers to E.-A. Leemans, *Studie over den wijsgeer Numenius van Apamea mit uitgave der fragmenten* (Brussels, 1937), p. 101 n. 4, who in turn deduces this meaning from Porphyry's summary (fr. 44 Des Places) of the contrast between the two souls in Numenius. Cf. also Proclus, *In Tim.* iii. 234, 10ff. Diehl. Concerning the fate of the irrational soul, Dillon, op. cit. (n. 10), p. 260, suggests 'presumably it survived indefinitely in the sublunar realm, constantly subjected to recycling in connexion with rebirth'. Deuse, op. cit. (n. 1), p. 79, however, in light of his preceding discussion of the world-souls in Numenius, argues more specifically that after the rational soul ascends to its divine source, the irrational soul, having lost its locus of existence, becomes one with the irrational psychic forces that originate from the interaction of the world–soul and the evil world–soul.

[92] For a comprehensive survey, E. R. Dodds (ed.), *Proclus, The Elements of Theology*^{2} (Oxford, 1963), pp. 313–21, is still standard; see also J. F. Finamore, *Iamblichus and the Theory of the Vehicle of the Soul* (Chico, 1985), pp. 1–6, with further literature at p. 7, n. 1; Deuse, op. cit. (n. 1), p. 218 n. 331; cf. O. Geudtner, *Die Seelenlehre der chaldäischen Orakel* (Meisenheim, 1971), p. 18 n. 83; R. Majercik (Text, trans., and comm.), *The Chaldean Oracles* (Leiden, 1989), pp. 31–3.

[93] See further, Dodds, op. cit. (n. 92), pp. 315f.; Finamore, op. cit. (n. 92), pp. 1f.

[94] See R. C. Kissling, 'The ὄχημα-πνεῦμα of the Neo-Platonists and the De Insomniis of Synesius of Cyrene', *AJPh* 43 (1922), 320 n. 21.

[95] See Dodds, op. cit. (n. 92), pp. 316f. J. Dillon, *Iamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis dialogos commentariorum fragmenta* (Leiden, 1973), pp. 371–2, argues on the basis of Proclus, *In Tim.* iii. 234, 8–18 Diehl that the πνευματικὸν ὄχημα may already have been known to Atticus and Albinus in the second century A.D. According to Proclus, both denied the immortality of the irrational soul (called here ἄλογος ζωή) and the pneumatic vehicle, though there is no evidence apart from this passage that either Atticus or Albinus ever held to the notion of the vehicle as it was developed in Neoplatonism. The problem is compounded by the question of the identity of Albinus (see n. 81 above). That this Albinus is not the author of the *Didaskalikos* is, of course, J. Whittaker's view: see 'Platonic Philosophy in the Early Empire', *ANRW* 36.1 (1987), 88–9. Alcinoos, at any rate, gives no evidence of the doctrine of the vehicle, except in the Platonic sense of the body as the ὄχημα of the head and the rational soul (176, 16–17 Whittaker). On Poseidonius as a possible catalyst for the Neoplatonic linkage of the *pneuma* and the luminous body, see N. Aujoulat, 'De la phantasia et du *pneuma* stoiciens d'après Sextus Empiricus, au corps lumineux neo-platonicien', *Pallas* 34 (1980), 123–46, esp. 132ff.

the celestial spheres from the irrational powers already existing in the cosmos. In the re-ascent of the soul the elements of both the vehicle and the irrational soul are dissolved again into the cosmos where they survive, albeit no longer as individual entities, but simply as the prerequisite matter for the process of genesis.[96] The ἄλογον thus lives on as a force distributed in the cosmos, though not as an individual irrational soul. Hence Porphyry, in a doxographical sketch drawn by Proclus, is given an intermediary place between the extreme positions of Atticus and Albinus who considered the irrational soul mortal and Iamblichus who gave it full immortality.[97] Iamblichus argued that the vehicle, having been created by the cosmic gods, is not dissolvable; it remains ever attached to the irrational soul, and both, though separated from the rational soul in the return to the One, are immortal.[98] Proclus' own position appears to be a compromise. He posited two vehicles, the first, created by the demiurge and made up of certain abiding 'highest points of the irrational life' (ἀκρότητες τῆς ἀλόγου ζωῆς), is immortal; the second, woven to the irrational, mortal life of the soul by the lesser gods, is discarded like successive layers of clothing during the soul's ascent.[99]

This has been a mere sketch of a complex doctrine and we have named only its prime representatives. But enough has been said to show that with the doctrine of the ὄχημα-πνεῦμα the controversy surrounding the lower, irrational soul reached its zenith. There are, generally speaking, many stimuli to the theorizing and debates about the soul among later Platonists: Platonic and Aristotelian psychology, the Stoic doctrine of *pneuma*, the Chaldean Oracles, and perhaps Gnostic and Oriental influences. Xenocrates' position on the fate of the lower parts of the soul should, however, be recognized as at least one strand within this nexus.[100] His belief that the

[96] See e.g. *Sent.* 29, p. 18, 6–7 Lamberz; *Antro nymph.* 11; *ap.* Procl. *In Tim.* iii. 234, 18ff. Diehl; *ap.* Iambl. *De an.* (in Stob. i. 384, 19–28 Wachsmuth) and comments by Deuse, op. cit. (n. 1), pp. 213–30; as Deuse argues emphatically (pp. 218ff.), although the vehicle and the irrational soul are intimately bound up with each other, they are not to be equated.

[97] Procl. *In Tim.* iii. 234, 9–30 Diehl. On Albinus here, see n. 95 above.

[98] See *In Tim.* fr. 81 Dillon (n. 95) and commentary ad loc. (pp. 371–7); Finamore, op. cit. (n. 92), pp. 17ff. On the creation of the vehicle by the cosmic gods (and not by the demiurge, *contra* Finamore, ibid. pp. 11ff.), see W. Deuse, *Gnomon* 59 (1987), 409f. Though the vehicle and the irrational soul can become increasingly purified (through theurgy), they do not enter the noetic realm; see Finamore, op. cit. pp. 145ff.

[99] *In. Tim.* iii. 236, 31ff. Diehl (on ἀκρότητες, see Dillon, op. cit. (n. 95), p. 374), *El. th.*, prop. 209 and Dodds ad loc. (pp. 306–8); for a comparison of Proclus and Iamblichus, see Finamore, op. cit. (n. 92), pp. 86ff.

[100] Another may have been his daemonology (cf. Heinze, pp. 110–23). Thus Porphyry held that those sublunary souls who subjugated their pneumatic bodies by force of reason were to be considered good daemons, whereas those who were controlled by the pneuma and its impulses and desires became κακοεργοί (*Abst.* 2.38 p. 167, 8–11; p. 167, 26–p. 168, 5 Nauck; cf. Deuse, op. cit. (n. 1), p. 216; Heinze, p. 120). The explanation of evil daemons in terms of overpowering affections recalls Xenocrates' belief, which we derived from Plutarch, that evil daemons were the souls of men in whom the affective and irrational element remained strong. (Origen the Platonist was undoubtedly an important influence on Porphyry's *De abstinentia*, but not, I think, to the exclusion of Xenocrates, Numenius, and Plotinus; I cannot follow H. Lewy, *Chaldean Oracles and Theurgy* (Paris, 1978), pp. 497–508, that Origen was Porphyry's 'only literary source'.) A significant difference between Xenocrates' daemons and later daemonology is the pneumatic body with which Neoplatonists invested the daemons. For both daemons and human souls one of the functions of the πνεῦμα was as the organ of sense perception and the imagination (αἰσθητικόν and φανταστικόν – cf. e.g. Simpl. *De an.* ad 403ª8 p. 17, 16–17 Hayduck); it thus provided an intermediary between sensations and the incorporeal soul (and also furnished a body that could be brought into Hades where souls might be punished by the φαντασία of their former sins; see Porph. *Sent.* 29; id. *ap.* Stob. i. 428, 8ff. Wachsmuth). The impulse for much of this comes from Aristotle's 'inherent breath' (πνεῦμα σύμφυτον, see e.g. *Somn. vig.* 456ª12

irrational part of the soul survives until its dissolution, when the rational part returns to the intelligible realm, comes closest of the positions we reviewed above to Porphyry's teaching of the vehicle of the irrational soul and also to Proclus' in regard to the second vehicle.[101]

This leads us to some final observations on the doxography of our excerpt from Damascius. Here Xenocrates (and Speusippus) are ranked with Iamblichus and Plutarch of the more recent philosophers (*τῶν νεωτέρων*) who extend immortality *μέχρι τῆς ἀλογίας*. The position of the latter two, however, would be more comfortably filled by Porphyry and Proclus, since they, like Xenocrates, bestow a limited immortality upon the irrational soul (in its conjunction with the pneumatic vehicle; the *δεύτερον ὄχημα* for Proclus). But Damascius groups Proclus and Porphyry separately as those who make the rational soul alone immortal, though this position more accurately describes that of Atticus and Albinus. Porphyry, as we saw above, stands in the middle of the polarities represented by Iamblichus at one end, and Atticus and Albinus at the other. By not entering into the subtleties of Porphyry's and Proclus' *Seelenlehre* and by omitting Atticus and Albinus altogether, Damascius' doxography by itself is somewhat confusing and potentially misleading. But as with

and W. D. Ross (ed.) *Aristotle's Parva Naturalia* (Oxford, 1955), pp. 40–3; see also n. 93 above, and Kissling, op. cit. (n. 94), 319); moreover, to some extent the *ὄχημα-πνεῦμα* may be considered the Neoplatonic response to Aristotle's premise (esp. of *De anima* ii) that sensations, being affections and movements, are only possible in the composite substance of body and soul (as a further step, Iamblichus' bestowal of immortality upon the irrational soul and its vehicle has been thought to meet 'the Aristotelian objection that a soul must be the *ἐντελέχεια* of *some* body'; Dodds, op. cit. (n. 92) *ad* prop. 209 (p. 307; cf. p. 317). As for Xenocrates, his daemons (which we saw to be the souls of the departed) were invisible and incorporeal; their sensitive element existed by participation in embodied souls (hence we spoke of a 'psychic bond') and enabled them to experience human affections only vicariously; it further explained the overwhelming tendency in some daemons towards the material and their consequent reincarnation. But their immateriality is problematical in at least two respects. First, in what did their sensitive, irrational component subsist? The second question arises out of the first: when the irrational part of the soul becomes weak and dissolves into the moon, and the rational part is freed to return to the intelligible realm, what is it exactly that is dissolved? In fr. 15 (above, pp. 145–6) Xenocrates speaks of certain divine powers that pervaded the material elements. Presumably those powers that pervaded the *aer*, the element characterizing Hades, are to be identified with the daemons. It is then conceivable that the irrational part of the daemon-soul derived from its element of *aer* a material substance, a sort of airy body (cf. the aerial creatures of *Epin.* 984e1; thereto, see Tarán, op. cit. (n. 16), pp. 283f.), that eventually dissolved into the moon, whose substance was composed of *aer* and the second density (fr. 56 H). But to this conjecture, based in part on the restoration of a lacuna (see n. 14 above), it is preferable to suppose that these were problems bequeathed by Xenocrates to our later Platonists. It is notably Porphyry's application of the *pneuma* body to daemons that went some way to answering the questions left by Xenocrates: the *πνεῦμα* of daemons was called *ἀερῶδες*; its hylic nature rendered it visible on occasion; and it could be dissolved into its element(s) (*ἀναστοιχειοῦσθαι* – used of human souls in Porph. *In Tim.* iii. 234, 21 Diehl, but also applicable to the *pneuma* of certain daemons which Porphyry calls *παθητικόν* and *φθαρτόν*, *Abst.* ii, 39, p. 168, 12–13 Nauck); see Dodds, op. cit. (n. 92), p. 319. While Porphyry's intricate daemonology is a product of a variety of sources and influences, many of its formulations appear to be Xenocratean in origin. See the accounts by T. Hopfner, *Griechisch-Ägyptischer Offenbarungszauber* i (Leipzig, 1921; repr. Amsterdam, 1974), pp. 21–8; E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung* iii/2 (Leipzig, 1903), pp. 727ff.; J. Bidez, *Vie de Porphyre* (Ghent, 1913), pp. 88–97 *passim*; Lewy, op. cit., pp. 497–502.

[101] In connection with Porphyry, Dodds, op. cit. (n. 92), p. 306 n. 4, compares 'the perishable *ψυχή* of the curious myth in Plut. *de facie*, 28, 943 A ff., which Reinhardt, *Kosmos und Sympathie* 318ff. refers to Poseidonius'. But Jones, op. cit. (n. 54), pp. 116–31 (see esp. 128ff.), has in the interim shown that the myth of the *Fac. lun.* is not that of Poseidonius but Plato (cf. n. 56 above). Jones's argument, though, should not be taken to rule out the intervening influence of Xenocrates on both Plutarch and Porphyry, especially in regard to the perishable irrational soul.

so many doxographical summaries, it exhorts us to go beyond itself and to examine the authors it enumerates – and those pertinent authors it omits – against the full background of their doctrines (to the extent that these survive). Having induced us to look closely at Xenocrates' view of the soul and to trace the possible vestiges of his thought in later Platonic psychology and speculations about the soul's afterlife, Damascius' doxography may have served to narrow the gap between 'the ancients and the moderns', the Old Academicians and later Platonists.*

Universität Passau HERMANN S. SCHIBLI

APPENDIX: HEINZE ON BODY–SOUL–INTELLECT IN PLUTARCH AND XENOCRATES

Plutarch describes the soul's attainment of immortality as the separation of intellect from soul (*Fac. lun.* 944e, cf. 943b). For this conception and its underlying tripartite schema of body–soul–intellect (*Fac. lun.* 943a) Heinze, wrongly I believe, regards Xenocrates as the main source. The essentials of Heinze's rather circuitous argument (137ff.) are these: at the end of the *Fac. lun.* (945c–d), the soul, being a mixed and median entity between the inanimate (i.e. the corporeal) and intellect, is compared to the moon, which is a mixture of things above and below and stands in relation to the sun as the earth to the moon. This comparison recalls for Heinze Plutarch's designation in the *Def. or.* of the moon as a mixed body in the physical universe and a daemonic copy (μίμημα δαιμόνιον, 416e), since it appears to belong to both earth and heaven. Plutarch's physical excursus is here preceded by the reference to Xenocrates' simile of the compound nature of daemons and the isosceles triangle (*Def. or.* 416d–e). Returning to the *Fac. lun.*, Heinze believes that Xenocrates' teaching on the densities and elements of the sun, stars, moon, and earth, where again the moon is presented as a mixed entity (943f–944a), confirms the connections among all these passages. Therefore he is certain that Xenocrates furnished the threefold composition of man as intellect, soul, and body, whereby each part derives from the sun, moon, and earth respectively (943a) and mirrors the hierarchy of god–daemon–man. But against Heinze's neatly interlocking reconstruction it may be objected that possibly the only bond linking these passages is Xenocrates' treatment of the moon as a compound substance (cf. W. Hamilton, *CQ* 28 (1934), 28 n. 2) and the comparison of the moon – perhaps only implicit in Xenocrates – to the mixed nature of daemons and the soul (cf. von Arnim, op. cit. (n. 55), p. 55). Moreover, to derive the *nous*–soul–body schema from Xenocrates seems to me to neglect the pronounced Platonic–Aristotelian elements of Plutarch's myths and doctrines (see n. 57 above). His terms describing the motivation for intellect's separation from soul are particularly revealing in this respect: 'It is separated by love for the image of the sun through which shines forth manifest the desirable and fair and divine and blessed towards which all nature in one way or another yearns...' (944e; Cherniss's translation (n. 56)). The hagiography of the sun and the natural teleology clearly echo Plato and Aristotle (for further parallels in Plutarch and references to source texts, see Cherniss, ibid. n. g, p. 213). In attributing the *nous*–soul–body triad to Xenocrates, Heinze is of course aware of the Platonic inspiration, but he thinks that Xenocrates distinguished *nous* and soul as separate substances to resolve the contradiction in

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Plato that manifests itself when Plato at times speaks of the soul as partite but at other times treats it as uniform and wholly rational. Heinze takes the anonymous *τὸ ἄλογον–τὸ λόγον ἔχον* distinction of *E.N.* 1102ª26 as pointing to Xenocrates (but see p. 152 above) and maintains in addition that Xenocrates will have emphasized more strongly any bipartition of the soul that may be found in Plato by calling the irrational part *ψυχή* and the rational part *νοῦς*. That Plutarch treated the soul and intellect as separate entities is reasonably certain, but whether he thereby reproduces Xenocrates' teaching as exactly as Heinze claims remains difficult to prove or disprove, though I would reiterate that Heinze's conclusions are vitiated by his slighting of the overall Platonic–Aristotelian conceptions that unify Plutarch's theories. As a final example, when Plutarch assures us that the substance of the soul, which with its earthly vestiges remains on the moon, is not our true selves, since 'the self of each of us is... that by which we reason and understand' (*αὐτός... ἕκαστος ἡμῶν... ἐστιν... ᾧ διανοούμεθα καὶ φρονοῦμεν*, 944f), Plutarch was very likely drawing on Aristotle's repeated assertions that *nous* is the true self; cf. e.g. *E.N.* 1166ª16–17: the good man acts for his own sake, 'that is for the sake of his reasoning part, which appears to be each man's self' (*τοῦ γὰρ διανοητικοῦ χάριν, ὅπερ ἕκαστος εἶναι δοκεῖ*. See further Cherniss, op. cit. (n. 56), n. d, p. 215). Yet Heinze asserts with alacrity: 'Der *νοῦς* ist *nach Xenocrates* des Menschen wahres Ich' (p. 143, my italics). On the general Platonic–Aristotelian character that informs Plutarch's *Fac. lun.* (and goes beyond mere eclecticism), see now P. Donini, 'Science and Metaphysics: Platonism, Aristotelianism, and Stoicism in Plutarch's *On the Face of the Moon*' in Dillon and Long, op. cit. (n. 57), pp. 126–44; on Plutarch's Platonic–Aristotelian conception of soul and intellect specifically, see Dillon's comments in the same work (n. 57).